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Abstract 
As a new software licensing model, software-as-a-service (SaaS) is gaining tremendous 
popularity across the globe. In this study, we investigate the competition between a new entrant 
and an incumbent in a SaaS market, and derive the optimal market entry strategy for the new 
entrant. One interesting finding is that, when its product quality is significantly lower than that of 
the incumbent, the new entrant should adopt an instant-release strategy, i.e., releasing its product 
at the start of the planning horizon. If the initial quality gap of the two products is small, the new 
entrant is better off adopting a late-release strategy, i.e., deferring the release of the new product 
until its quality surpasses that of the existing product. We also find that instant-release and late-
release are essentially low-quality-low-price and high-quality-high-price strategies, respectively. 
In addition, we explore the scenario where the two competing products are partially compatible, 
and characterize the impact of asymmetric incompatibility on the two vendors’ market strategies 
at equilibrium. We find that the new entrant’s zero-profit region expands as the level of 
incompatibility between the two competing products increases. Moreover, if the new entrant 
adopts the instant-release strategy, its profit decreases with the level of incompatibility. When 
the level of incompatibility is sufficiently high, the instance-release strategy may not be viable 
for the new entrant. On the other hand, if the new entrant adopts the late-release strategy, its 
profit increases with the level of incompatibility from its product to the incumbent’s, but 
decreases with the level of incompatibility in the other direction.  
 Keywords: Game theory, Duopoly, Market entry strategy, Software-as-a-Service, Network 
effects, Asymmetric compatibility, Switching cost  
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Quality, Pricing, and Release Time: Optimal Market Entry Strategy for New 
Software-As-A-Service Vendors 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, Software-as-a-service (SaaS), a cloud-based alternative to the traditional 
on-premises software delivery model, has gained tremendous popularity across the globe 
(Columbus 2012). The increasing popularity of SaaS is mainly attributed to its lower cost of 
ownership and ease of deployment, as compared to its traditional on-premises counterpart. The 
industry has seen a clear trend toward adopting SaaS products (Hamerman 2014). Gartner 
forecasted that global spending on SaaS would continue to grow and reach $32.8 billion in 2016 
(Columbus 2013). More recently, Forrester published an even bolder projection, estimating that 
world-wide revenue from SaaS software sales will reach $106 billion in 2016 (Gagliordi 2015). 
Given the tremendous growth of SaaS adoption, Cisco projected that by 2018, 59% of the total 
cloud workloads will be used to support SaaS applications, an increase from 41% in 2013 (Cisco 
2014). Although the projected growth rates may vary, the consensus is that the shift to SaaS and 
the expeditious growth of SaaS revenue will likely continue into the foreseeable future.  
Meanwhile, the profit margin of the SaaS software sector lags far behind its revenue growth. 
As the SaaS market expands, market competition also intensifies, and as a result, the SaaS 
software sector is not doing well financially. According to a Software Industry Financial Report 
(Software Equity Group 2015), 59% of the publicly traded SaaS vendors were unprofitable in 
2014, and around 90% of them had a margin below their on-premises peers. Despite the dismal 
profit margin of the sector, the top performers, mostly market leaders in their respective software 
categories (e.g., NetSuite in ERP, and Tableau in business intelligence) have delivered admirable 
returns. It is mostly vendors in the middle or lower ends of the market spectrum that are 
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struggling to gain market share and increase revenue (Software Equity Group 2015).  
After the rapid expansion in recent years, most of the major SaaS categories are already 
occupied or dominated by incumbent vendors. Vendors seeking to profit from the growing SaaS 
market but having missed the opportunity to enter their market segment as a leader are now 
facing challenging market conditions. For instance, CRM SaaS vendors were coming under 
increasing downward pricing pressure when a new vendor entered the market (Beal 2008). More 
recently, it was reported that SaaS prices had been kept artificially low due to intensified 
competition (Kwang 2012). Another report by the Software Equity Group (2015) showed that the 
median profit margin of public SaaS companies had declined substantially in recent years, from a 
peak of 9.6% in 2010 to -9.8% in 2014. In contrast, the median profit margin of the on-premises 
software vendors was 17% in 2014.  
For incumbent SaaS vendors, the intensifying market competition, downward pricing 
pressure, and decreasing profit margin unavoidably affect their bottom line; for new market 
entrants, such unfavorable market conditions significantly reduce their chance of survival. 
Therefore, it is critical for new entrants to make informed decisions on market positioning at the 
time of entry. Thus, our primary goal in the present research is to derive an optimal market entry 
strategy for new vendors who seek to enter a SaaS market already occupied by incumbents.  
Since consumers are primarily concerned with their net utility derived from consuming the 
product, of critical importance is the pricing and product quality decisions of the new entrants. In 
fact, quality and price are considered the two most important decision variables that new entrants 
can leverage so as to gain a foothold in a competitive market. For instance, in the advanced 
analytics SaaS market where SAS and IBM dominate, startups such as Alpine Data Labs 
(alpinenow.com) and Revolution Analytics (revolutionanalytics.com) were able to use low 
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pricing strategy to grab some market share from their big incumbent competitors (Henschen 
2011). Similarly, in the CRM SaaS market, Highrise (highrisehq.com) focused on offering low-
cost and simple solutions to cost-sensitive customers (Tatum 2013). On the other hand, there are 
vendors who choose to adopt a premium pricing strategy, under which they invest heavily to 
deliver the best software package, and then charge a premium price. SuccessFactors 
(successfactors.com), now part of SAP, adopts such a strategy with a superior product quality in 
the human capital management SaaS market (Cochrane et al. 2014). Thus, one of the research 
questions we plan to address in this study is under what conditions the low-quality-low-price 
strategy is preferable to the high-quality-high-price strategy and vice versa.  
A higher product quality typically demands more development time, which may cause delay 
to the release of the product. Hence, the desirable product quality is a key factor that affects a 
vendor’s decision on market entry timing. Although the product quality and time-to-market 
tradeoff has been well studied in the general new product development and marketing literature 
(e.g., Cohen et al. 1996; Bayus 1997; Rodríguez-Pinto et al. 2011), no extant work has studied 
such a tradeoff for SaaS products, which have their own distinctive characteristics such as 
subscription pricing. In this research, we not only explicitly model the quality and release time 
tradeoff, but also investigate how the new entrant’s decision on product quality and market entry 
timing affects the pricing, market share, and profitability of the vendors engaged in competition.  
Furthermore, given that software products are typically subject to strong network effects 
(Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gallaugher and Wang 2002), we attempt to examine how the 
within- and cross-product network effects affect market competition and hence the market entry 
strategy for new entrants. Finally, since the prior literature on information goods have shown that 
switching cost and lock-in effects can affect vendors’ quality or pricing strategies (e.g., Zhu and 
5 
Zhou 2012; Fuentelsaz et al. 2012; Chen and Wu 2012), we also analyze the impact of switching 
cost on the new entrant’s market entry timing and pricing decisions.  
The market scenario we analyze in this study is described as follows. Attracted by the rapidly 
expanding market, a new vendor seeks to enter a segment of the SaaS market, where one 
incumbent vendor is providing a SaaS product considered to be a substitute to the new entrant’s 
product. At the start of the time horizon, the product quality of the new entrant is lower than that 
of the incumbent. By deferring the release of its product, the new entrant can further improve the 
product quality. The incumbent is ready to adjust its product price in response to the market entry 
of the new entrant. In the meantime, consumers stand to adapt as the market structure changes 
from monopoly to duopoly, and will choose the SaaS product that maximizes their utility. Using 
a game-theoretic modeling framework, we develop a duopoly model of competition between the 
incumbent vendor and the new entrant, and derive the optimal pricing, quality, and market entry 
timing for the new entrant. By examining the derived optimal market entry strategy, we also hope 
to better understand how the various market factors, such as network effects and switching cost 
play a role in affecting the new vendor’s entry strategy and market outcomes.  
Some interesting findings emerge from our analysis. First, we find that if the initial quality 
gap between the competing products is sufficiently large, it is optimal for the new entrant to 
adopt a low-quality-low-price strategy and release its product immediately (i.e., instant-release 
strategy); otherwise, the new entrant is better off adopting a high-quality-high-price strategy, 
which allows the new entrant to defer releasing the product until its quality surpasses that of the 
incumbent product (i.e., late-release strategy). Second, when the competing products are partially 
compatible, the zero-profit region for the new entrant, in which the new entrant would lose the 
entire market, expands with the level of incompatibility. Third, a higher level of incompatibility 
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(in either direction) will reduce the new entrant’s profit derived from the instant-release strategy. 
Thus, at a sufficiently high level of incompatibility, the instance-release strategy may turn out 
not to be viable for the new entrant. On the other hand, when the new entrant adopts the late-
release strategy, a higher level of incompatibility from its product to the incumbent’s, which 
essentially make it more difficult for the consumers of the incumbent to leverage the cross-
product network effects from the new entrant, increases its profit, whereas a higher level of 
incompatibility in the other direction may reduce its profit. Fourth, we show that switching costs, 
if considered, can help the incumbent gain market power over the new entrant by taking 
advantage of the installed base established in the monopoly stage. In addition, with a higher 
switching cost, the new entrant is more likely to adopt the instant-release strategy. Finally, we 
show that our main findings on the new entrant’s optimal market entry strategy are robust even 
when some of the key assumptions in our models are relaxed. 
Our research makes substantial novel theoretical contributions to the literature on vertical 
differentiation. First, this work is the first attempt to capture the novel three-way tradeoff among 
service duration, development cost, and product quality, a unique tradeoff faced by SaaS vendors, 
which has not been addressed in conventional vertical differentiation models (e.g., Blattburg and 
Wisniewski 1989; Wauthy 1996; Boccard and Wauthy 2010). Second, our model is the only one 
that studies vertical differentiated products with subscription-based pricing, while all the prior 
vertical differentiation models (e.g., Hung and Schmitt 1988; Lutz 1997; Bergemann and Välimäki 
2002; Liu and Zhang 2013) analyze purchase-to-own products (i.e., customers pay a one-time 
price to acquire the ownership of a product and can use it throughout its lifespan). Third, our model 
is the only one that uses a continuous time decision variable to capture the release of the products 
facing vertical competitions, while the other models either do not consider a continuous time 
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dimension (e.g., Noh and Moschini 2006) or do not consider release time as a decision variable 
(e.g., Bergemann and Välimäki 2002). This unique feature in our model setup allows us to identify 
the optimal timing of product release from a continuous time interval for the new entrant, taking 
into account the aforementioned three-way tradeoff. Fourth, our model is the only one that 
incorporates all of the three important factors important to SaaS products (i.e., network effects, 
product compatibility, and switching cost), and characterizes their effects on the market entry 
strategy of SaaS vendors. Lastly, we show that when the competing SaaS products are partially 
compatible, the new entrant can choose from among three possible release strategies: instance 
release, Type I late-release, and Type II late-release. To the best of our knowledge, such a finding 
has not been reported in any conventional vertical competition model.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. 
Using a two-stage model that includes a monopoly stage and a duopoly stage, we first analyze 
the scenario where the products offered by the incumbent and the new entrant are fully 
compatible, and then examine the more general scenario where the two competing products are 
partially compatible. Subsequently, in the model extensions we take into account factors such as 
consumers’ switching cost, and analyze how such factors would affect the new entrant’s market 
entry strategies. We conclude the paper with discussions on research contributions, practical 
implications, and limitations that could be addressed in future studies.  
 
Related Literature 
The present research is related to several streams of literature. The first stream is on network 
effects, which arise when the utility a consumer derives from a good increases with the total 
number of consumers of that good (Katz and Shapiro 1985). Researchers have found empirical 
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evidence of network effects in many software products, including spreadsheet (Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer 1996), web servers (Gallaugher and Wang 2002), video games (Shankar and Bayus 
2003). Similarly, network effects have been analyzed for subscription-based information 
technology services (Niculescu et al. 2012).  
Another stream of related literature is on the tradeoffs between product quality and time-to-
market. Earlier analytical and empirical studies in this research stream have focused on 
monopolist markets (e.g., Kalish and Lilien 1986; Bayus 1997). More recently, there are studies 
that focus on the decisions under duopoly settings (e.g., Savin and Terwiesch 2005; Kopel and 
Löffler 2008). These prior studies differ from the present research in that they focus on general 
product categories such as computers, copier, and cars, without considering the characteristics of 
software products (e.g., low margin cost of production and network effects), let alone other 
distinctive features of SaaS products (e.g., subscription pricing).  
The present research is more closely related to the prior literature on SaaS or similar products 
such as application service providers (ASPs). The earlier studies focus on deriving the pricing 
and licensing strategies for monopolistic SaaS or ASP vendors (e.g., Choudhary et al. 1998; 
Gurnani and Karlapalem 2001; Cheng and Koehler 2003). These studies show that non-perpetual 
software offering provides vendors with more flexibility in product offerings that can help 
improve their profitability.  
Some of the prior research on SaaS compares the SaaS licensing model and the perpetual 
licensing model for monopolistic vendors. Choudhary (2007) finds that the difference in 
dissemination of new features between SaaS and perpetual licensing affects a monopolistic 
vendor’s decision to invest on product quality. Specifically, under the SaaS model, the vendor 
tends to invest more, leading to better quality and higher profit compared to the perpetual 
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licensing model. In another study, Zhang and Seidmann (2010) examine the different licensing 
options available to a monopolistic vendor, and show that under strong network effects, the 
hybrid licensing model, under which both SaaS and perpetual licensing are made available to 
consumers, is the most profitable option.  
In addition, some prior research on SaaS analyzes the competition between SaaS and 
perpetual software vendors. Fan et al. (2009) consider a SaaS product a bundle of software and 
service. Their analyses show that compared with shrink-wrap software, the service component of 
a SaaS product leads to lower implementation cost for users, higher operation cost for vendors, 
and the equilibrium market price is higher. However, the higher operation cost may affect the 
SaaS vendor’s ability to invest on product quality in the long run. In a more recent study, Ma and 
Seidmann (2015) examine the competition between a traditional off-the-shelf software vendor 
and a SaaS vendor that charges consumers per-transaction fees. The study shows that the lack-of-
fit cost of the SaaS product is a key factor in determining which product(s) will end up 
occupying the market. Based on the analytical results, the authors also offer some pricing and 
quality recommendations to vendors of both types of software.  
A key difference between the present study and the aforementioned streams of research on 
SaaS is that we analyze a duopoly market with two SaaS vendors competing for market share 
and profit, whereas the focus of the prior research streams was on either monopolistic vendors or 
the competition between a SaaS vendor and a perpetual software vendor.  
Prior research with a focus on the direct competition between SaaS vendors is rare. Fishburn 
and Odlyzko (1999) investigate the existence of competitive equilibria when one vendor adopts a 
policy of fixed subscription fee per period and the other charges on a per-use basis, and find that 
in the absence of collusion, competition will lead to ruinous price wars. To the best of our 
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knowledge, the closest study to ours is Ma and Kauffman (2014), which analyzes the pricing and 
quality strategies for two competing SaaS vendors. One of its main findings is that clients’ 
switching costs play a critical role in determining the outcome of the competition. For instance, 
an increase in switching cost can significantly worsen the position of the less competitive vendor, 
while the more competitive vendor can charge a higher price and achieve a significantly higher 
profit. Although the present research and Ma and Kauffman (2014) both study market 
competition between two SaaS vendors, there are significant differences in terms of research 
focus, model assumptions, and findings. For instance, we focus on deriving the market entry 
strategy for a new entrant, whereas the previous study does not differentiate between an 
incumbent and a new entrant. Moreover, we consider the tradeoff between quality, development 
costs, and market entry timing, whereas Ma and Kauffman assume that the competing products 
are both available at time zero, and development costs are considered sunk cost. In addition, we 
explicitly model the impact of product compatibility and the network effects on the two vendors’ 
market decisions, while compatibility and network effects are not considered by the prior study. 
Furthermore, consumers’ willing-to-pay is continuously distributed in our model, which is 
different from Ma and Kauffman’s discrete valuation assumption.  
A Two-Stage Model 
Consider two SaaS vendors, Vendors A and B, providing vertically differentiated products, 
products A and B, respectively. Without loss of generality, let Vendor A be the incumbent and 
Vendor B the new entrant. Following a common practice in the SaaS market, both vendors adopt 
subscription-based pricing, i.e., consumers are charged a fixed subscription fee per unit time 
(Fishburn and Odlyzko 1999). As shown in Figure 1, at time 0, the earliest time at which Product 
B passes the minimum feature and quality threshold and can be released, Vendor A has already 
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released its product at time ߬஺ (߬஺ < 0). Here it is worth noting that Vendor A, when releasing 
its product, has made its pricing (for the monopoly stage) and product quality decisions. We 
assume that such decisions, once being made, remain unchanged throughout the monopoly stage. 
This is because once it has released its product and developed a large customer base, the 
incumbent becomes far less flexible than a challenger that has yet to enter the market, and cannot 
change its plans rapidly and frequently due to possible technology inertia and structural inertia 
(Ghemawat 1991; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Colombo and Delmastro 2002).  
 Figure 1. Two Stages of the Demand Window 
Since the main purpose of the present study is to explore the optimal market entry strategy 
for the new vendor, we focus on the finite demand window [0, ܦ] in subsequent analysis. We 
assume that at time 0, Vendor B decides on its timing of market entry, denoted by ߬஻, ߬஻ ≥ 0. 
At ߬஻, product B is released and the two vendors start to compete by choosing their subscription 
prices ݌஺஽ and ݌஻஽, respectively, where the superscript “D” stands for duopoly.  
We also assume that the development cost that Vendor B has incurred prior to time 0 is sunk. 
Thus, Vendor B makes its decisions based on the net profit derived in the finite demand window 
[0, ܦ] (Cohen et al. 1996). The quality of product B at time 0, denoted by ݍ஻଴, however, is 
lower than that of product A at time 0, denoted by ݍ஺଴, i.e., ݍ஻଴ < ݍ஺଴. Hence the initial quality 
gap of the two products is Δݍ଴ = ݍ஺଴ − ݍ஻଴. Vendor B can also choose a release time ߬஻ > 0 
to continue developing its product after time 0. Following previous studies (Cohen et al. 1996), 
we assume that the quality of product B at time ߬஻, ݍ஻(߬஻), increases linearly with ߬஻, i.e., 
ݍ஻(߬஻) = ݍ஻଴ + ߣ1߬஻,          (1) 
Time 0 ߬஻ ߬஺ 
Monopoly Stage Duopoly Stage 
ܦ 
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where ߣଵ > 0 is the rate of quality improvement for product B in the product development 
stage.  
It is worth noting that in practice, SaaS vendors can continue to improve the quality of their 
products even after release. In fact, continuous quality improvement is considered a key 
advantage of SaaS in comparison with perpetual licensing (e.g., Choudhary 2007). However, to 
ensure that the end users’ experience is maximized, SaaS vendors usually do not release a 
product until its core features are completed and its quality reaches a certain threshold. After 
release, the focus of quality improvement typically shifts to product maintenance and 
incremental feature improvements. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the rate of quality 
improvement after release is approximately the same for both vendors.1 Therefore, after the 
release of product B, the qualities of the two products take the following forms,  
൜ݍ஺(߬) = ݍ஺଴ + ߣଶ߬,                             ߬ ∈ [0, ܦ],ݍ஻(߬) = ݍ஻଴ + ߣଵ߬஻ + ߣଶ(߬ − ߬஻),    ߬ ∈ [߬஻, ܦ],     (2) 
where ߣଶ, ߣଶ > 0, is the rate of quality improvement for the two vendors after release, and it is 
assumed to be lower than ߣଵ.2 Following prior studies (e.g., Calantone and Di Benedetto 2000), 
we assume that the development cost for product B and the maintenance cost are both linear 
functions of time. We denote Vendor B’s development cost (per unit time) before release by ݇ଵ, 
and the cost per unit time incurred for product maintenance and incremental feature 
improvements after release by ݇ଶ. It is reasonable to assume that development cost is higher 
than maintenance cost, i.e., ݇ଵ > ݇ଶ. Given the fixed demand window, delaying the release by 
one unit time increases the development cost by ݇ଵ and decreases the maintenance cost by ݇ଶ, 
                                                          
1 In one of our model extensions (Model Extension III in Section A.15 of Online Supplements), this assumption is relaxed, and our main findings still hold qualitatively.  
2 We do not consider the less interesting case where ߣଵ ≤ ߣଶ as the new entrant in that case would never catch up with the incumbent in product quality.  
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hence we term the difference of two costs the marginal development cost (per unit time), which 
is denoted by ݇ (݇ = ݇ଵ − ݇ଶ). Thus, the sum of the development cost and maintenance cost is 
݇ଵ߬஻ + ݇ଶ(ܦ − ߬஻) = (݇ + ݇ଶ)߬஻ + ݇ଶ(ܦ − ߬஻) = ݇߬஻ + ݇ଶܦ. 
In the above equation, since ݇ଶܦ is a constant and hence does not affect the release strategy, we 
only retain the total marginal development cost in the rest of the analysis:3 
ܿ = ݇߬஻.            (3) 
Figure 2 illustrates the product quality of each product as a function of time ߬. The time 
instance when product B catches up with product A in quality is ߬ா = ୼௤బఒ , where ߣ = ߣଵ − ߣଶ 
is the difference between the rates of quality improvement for product B before and after its 
release.  
 
Figure 2. Product Quality as a Function of Time 
On the demand side, the net utility that a consumer derives from consuming a SaaS product 
depends on her valuation of the product and the network effects. We use consumer type ߠ to 
capture consumers’ heterogeneity in valuation toward a given SaaS product. Following previous 
studies (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube 2001; Pang and Etzion 2012; Cheng and Liu 2012), we 
                                                          
3 As shown in Section A.14 of Online Supplements, when the marginal development cost is a quadratic function of the development time, our main findings on market entry strategy still hold.  
ݍ஻(߬) 
0 
ݍ஺଴ 
߬ ߬ா 
ݍ஻଴ 
ݍ஺(߬) 
߬஻ 
ݍ஺(߬) 
0 ߬஻ ߬ 
ݍ஺଴ 
ݍ஻଴ 
ݍ஻(߬) 
߬ா 
(b) Product B is Released after ߬ா (a) Product B is Released before ߬ா 
ݍ ݍ 
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assume that ߠ is uniformly distributed over [ߠ଴, 1], and the potential market size is normalized 
to (1 − ߠ଴) accordingly. Here, ߠ଴ represents the type of consumers with the minimum 
willingness-to-pay, and is assumed to be non-negative. Furthermore, we do not consider the 
scenario where both vendors serve only the high-end market (ߠ ≥ ଵଶ) while completely ignoring 
the low-end market. Thus, we assume ߠ଴ ∈ ቂ0, ଵଶቁ in our analysis.  
We also consider network effects, which refer to the phenomenon that the value of a product 
increases with its network size. As is common in the prior literature (e.g., Jing 2007; Zhang and 
Seidmann 2010), we assume that the benefit resulting from network effects increases linearly 
with the network size. We denote the installed based or network size of product A in the 
monopoly stage by ܳ஺ெ, and those of products A and B in the duopoly stage by ܳ஺஽ and ܳ஻஽, 
respectively. Then, in the duopoly stage, the net utility (per unit time) that a type ߠ consumer 
gains from consuming product ݅, ݅ ∈ {ܣ, ܤ} , is  
ܷ(ߠ, ݍ௜(߬)) = ߠݍ௜(߬) − ݌௜஽ + ߙܳ௜஽ + ߚ௝ܳ௝஽ , ݅, ݆ ∈ {ܣ, ܤ}, ݅ ≠ ݆,    (4) 
where ߙ ≥ 0 represents the intensity of network effects, measuring the increase in the 
consumer’s willingness-to-pay when an additional consumer joins the network, and ߚ௝ ∈ [0, ߙ] 
represents the intensity of cross-product network effects that users of product ݆ have on those of 
product ݅. More specifically, ߚ௝ measures the increase in the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for 
product ݅ when an additional consumer joins the network of product ݆. We would like to note 
that the values for ߚ஺ and ߚ஻ may not be the same. This is because a vendor with a relatively 
low market share (e.g., a new entrant) may intentionally make its product compatible with the 
product having a relatively high market share in order to take advantage of the latter’s larger 
network. The vendor with the relatively high market share, on the other hand, does not always 
prefer to make its product compatible with the product having a low market share. Rather, it may 
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try to maintain a high level of incompatibility to avoid the potential erosion of its consumer base. 
For example, software products such as Apache OpenOffice can often be used to process files 
created with Microsoft Office, which is in the position of market dominance, but not vice versa. 
For notational convenience, we denote the level of incompatibility from product ݆ to product 
݅, which essentially captures the level of difficulty for the users of product ݅ to leverage the 
cross-product network effects arising from product ݆, by ߛ௝, ߛ௝ = ߙ − ߚ௝. Thus, the level of 
incompatibility between the two substitutable products is determined by the values of the 
parameters ߚ௝, ݆ ∈ {ܣ, ܤ}. If ߚ஺ = ߚ஻ = ߙ (ߚ஺ = ߚ஻ = 0), then ߛ஺ = ߛ஻ = 0 (ߛ஺ = ߛ஻ = ߙ) 
and the two products are fully compatible (fully incompatible); if 0 < {ߚ஺, ߚ஻} < ߙ, then 0 <
{ߛ஺, ߛ஻} < ߙ and the two products are partially compatible (or partially incompatible). In the 
following three sections, we first derive the optimal price, and then separately examine the full-
compatibility and the partial-compatibility scenarios. The key notations used in our models are 
summarized in Table 1.  
We employ a game-theoretic framework to derive the optimal pricing and quality decisions 
for the two vendors. The order of play for the two vendors and their consumers is as follows. 
(i) Vendor B, the new entrant, chooses its time of entry;  
(ii) Given Vendor B’s time of entry, Vendors A and B choose their respective subscription 
prices for the duopoly stage;  
(iii) In response to the vendors’ decisions, consumers subscribe to the product that would 
maximize their net utility. 
As is customary in backward induction, we first obtain the two vendors’ optimal subscription 
prices, and then solve the optimal product release time for the new entrant.  
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Table 1. Summary of Notations 
Notation Description 
ܦ Demand window 
ߠ Consumer type, capturing heterogeneous consumer valuation toward a given 
SaaS product 
ߠ଴ Type of consumers with the minimum willingness-to-pay  
߬஻ Product B’s release time 
ߣଵ Rate of product B’s quality improvement before release 
ߣଶ Rate of quality improvement for products A and B after release 
ߣ Difference between the rates of quality improvement before and after release 
݇ Vendor B’s marginal development cost (per unit time), ݇ = ݇ଵ − ݇ଶ 
ݍ஺(߬), ݍ஻(߬) Quality of product A and product B at time ߬, respectively 
ݍ஺଴, ݍ஻଴ Initial quality (at time 0) of product A and product B, respectively, ݍ஻଴ < ݍ஺଴ 
Δݍ଴ Initial quality gap (at time 0), i.e., Δݍ଴ = ݍ஺଴ − ݍ஻଴ 
݌஺஽, ݌஻஽ Subscription prices of the two products in the duopoly stage 
ܳ஺ெ Network size of product A in the monopoly stage 
ܳ஺஽, ܳ஻஽ Network sizes of the two products in the duopoly stage 
ߨ஺஽, ߨ஻஽ Profit rates of the two products in the duopoly stage 
Π஺, Π஻  Total profits of the two products in the demand window [0, ܦ] 
ߙ Intensity of (within-product) network effects 
ߚ௝ Intensity of cross-product network effects (from product ݆ to product ݅) 
ߛ௝ Level of incompatibility (from product ݆ to product ݅), ߛ௝ = ߙ − ߚ௝ 
ܿௌ Consumers’ switching cost  
߬ா Time instance when the new entrant catches up with the incumbent in quality 
 
Optimal Price and Profit Rate  
We first assume that Vendor B’s market entry timing is given, and its development cost is sunk. 
In such a case, maximizing each vendor’s total profit in the duopoly stage is equivalent to 
maximizing its profit rate, i.e., profit per unit time. We examine the two cases, i.e., ݍ஺(߬஻) <
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ݍ஻(߬஻) (as shown in Figure 2(a)) and ݍ஺(߬஻) > ݍ஻(߬஻) (as shown in Figure 2(b)), separately. 
Since the equilibrium solutions in the two cases are symmetric with respect to the quality of the 
two products, to avoid repetition, we denote the product with higher quality upon the release of 
product B by H and the other one by L. That is, if ݍ஺(߬஻) > ݍ஻(߬஻), H=A, L=B; otherwise, 
H=B, L=A. The notations for price, demand, and profit rate are revised accordingly. 
For analytical tractability, following previous studies (Dutta et al. 1995; Hoppe and 
Lehmann‐Grube 2001), we assume that the value of ߠ଴, which denotes the type of consumers 
with the minimum willingness-to-pay, is set in such a way that all consumers would purchase 
either product A or B in the duopoly stage.4 Let ߠ෠஽ denote the type of consumer who is 
indifferent between products H and L. From Equation (4), we have  
ߠ෠஽ݍு(߬஻) − ݌ு஽ + ߙܳு஽ + ߚ௅ܳ௅஽ = ߠ෠஽ݍ௅(߬஻) − ݌௅஽ + ߙܳ௅஽ + ߚுܳு஽,   (5) 
where ܳு஽ = 1 − ߠ෠஽ and ܳ௅஽ = ߠ෠஽ − ߠ଴ are the network sizes of products H and L, 
respectively. From Equation (5), we obtain  
ߠ෠஽ = ௣ಹವି௣ಽವିఏబఊಽିఊಹ௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಹିఊಽ,.       (6) 
As explained earlier, ߛ௝ = ߙ − ߚ௝ represents the level of incompatibility from product j to 
product i, which essentially captures the level of difficulty for the users of product ݅ to leverage 
the cross-product network effects arising from product ݆, ݅, ݆ ∈ {ܪ, ܮ}, ݅ ≠ ݆, That is, with a 
higher ߛ௝, users of product ݅ derive a lower utility from the network of product ݆.  
                                                          
4 This full-market-coverage assumption excludes a practically trivial, albeit theoretically possible, solution; the details of this 
solution are provided in a model extension in which this assumption is relaxed (Model Extension IV in Section A.16 of Online Supplements).  
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We adopt the common assumption that the marginal cost of serving an additional customer of 
information goods is zero. Then, maximizing the profit rate of each vendor is equivalent to 
maximizing the product of its subscription price and market share:  
ቐ
max௣ಽವ ߨ௅ = ݌௅஽൫ߠ෠஽ − ߠ଴൯,max௣ಹವ ߨு = ݌ு஽൫1 − ߠ෠஽൯,
           (7) 
      s.t. ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠஽ ≤ 1,              
             ݌௅஽ ≥ 0, ݌ு஽ ≥ 0.             
At the fulfilled expectation equilibrium (Katz and Shapiro 1985), the equilibrium prices, 
demand, and profit rates for the two vendors take the following forms: 
a. If ൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ ≥  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு), the equilibrium prices, demand, and profit rates 
for the two vendors are given by 
ቐ ݌ு஽∗ =
(ଶିఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಽାఊಹ)
ଷ ,
݌௅஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)ଷ ,
       (8-1) 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓߠ෠஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵାఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵାଶఏబ)ఊಽି(ఏబାଶ)ఊಹ௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,
ܳு஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଶିఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಽାఊಹ)௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,    
ܳ௅஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵିଶఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,   
     (8-2) 
൞ ߨு
஽∗ = ଵଽ ൣ(ଶିఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಽାఊಹ)൧
మ
௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,
ߨ௅஽∗ = ଵଽ ൣ(ଵିଶఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)൧
మ
௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ .
     (8-3) 
b. If 0 < ൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ < ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு), the equilibrium prices, demand, and profit 
rates for the two vendors take the following forms:  
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ቊ ݌ு஽∗ = ߠ଴൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ + ߛு(1 − ߠ଴),݌௅஽∗ = 0,                                                              
  (9-1) 
ቐߠ
෠஽∗ = ߠ଴,   ܳு஽∗ = 1 − ߠ଴ܳ௅஽∗ = 0,    
,            (9-2) 
ቊ ߨு஽∗ = ߠ଴൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛு(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ,ߨ௅஽∗ = 0.                                                                                
   (9-3) 
(All proofs of equilibria, lemmas, propositions, and corollaries are relegated to the Online 
Supplements.)  
As shown below, our analysis on the equilibrium solutions (8) and (9) leads to several 
interesting analytical findings.  
Lemma 1: The equilibrium prices and profit rates for the two products remain constant in the 
duopoly stage if the quality difference of the two products is fixed; otherwise, they increase with 
the quality difference of the two products. 
Given our assumption that the rates of quality improvement for the two products after release 
are equal, their quality gap remains unchanged in the duopoly stage. Therefore, although 
consumers at large benefit from the quality improvement, as long as the quality difference of the 
two products upon the release time of product B is exogenous, the two vendors do not change 
their respective subscription prices, maintaining constant market shares and profit rates 
throughout the duopoly stage.  
By examining the conditions for the equilibrium, we find that when the quality difference 
between the two products falls within a specific region, i.e., ൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ ∈
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ቂ0, ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு)ቃ, the equilibrium price and profit rate for Vendor L drop to zero. Hereafter, 
we refer to this region as the zero-profit region for Vendor L. Thus, when deciding on the 
optimal release time, Vendor B, if having chosen to target the low-end market, should avoid 
falling within this region. When ߛ௅ = ߛு = 0 (i.e., the two products are fully compatible), the 
above zero-profit region for quality difference shrinks to 0 (i.e., ݍு(߬஻) = ݍ௅(߬஻)), indicating 
that it is not profitable for the new entrant to release a product of the same quality as the existing 
product. The observation below presents an interesting property of the zero-profit region. 
Observation 1: Vendor L’s zero-profit region expands with the incompatibility between the two 
products (i.e., ߛு and ߛ௅).  
The above observation suggests that the higher the level of incompatibility (either from H to 
L or from L to H), the larger is the zero-profit region for Vendor L.  
We summarize our results regarding the impact of the level of incompatibility on the 
equilibrium outcomes (8) and (9) in Table 2. As shown in the table, when the quality difference 
upon the release time of product B is relatively large, Vendor L can benefit from a lower level of 
incompatibility (in either direction) between the two products. On the other hand, while Vendor 
H can also benefit from a lower level of incompatibility from the low quality product to its 
product, it prefers to have a higher level of incompatibility from its product to the low quality 
product. 
Table 2. Impact of Levels of Incompatibility on Price, Demand, and Profit Rate 
Changes in levels of incompatibility ݌ு஽∗ ܳு஽∗ ߨு∗  ݌௅஽∗ ܳ௅஽∗ ߨ௅∗ 
(ݍு − ݍ௅) ≥  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு)  
ߛு increases ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
ߛ௅ increases ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
(ݍு − ݍ௅) < ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு)  
ߛு increases ↑ − ↑ − − − 
ߛ௅ increases − − − − − − 
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In the region ((ݍு − ݍ௅) <  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு)), the zero-profit region for Vendor L, the 
profit rate of Vendor H increases with ߛு. This is because a higher ߛு will better differentiate 
product H from product L by decreasing the network value of the latter, and, as a result, Vendor 
H can charge a higher price for its product.  
With the two vendors’ optimal subscription prices obtained, we next derive the optimal 
product release time for the new entrant in full-compatibility and partial-compatibility scenarios.  
Fully Compatible SaaS Products 
To rapidly gain a footing in a new market, a new entrant often has no option but to make its 
product as compatible with the existing product as possible Therefore, in this section, we focus 
on the scenario where product B is made fully compatible with product A (i.e., ߚ஺ = ߚ஻ = ߙ). 
Under such a scenario, consumers of the two products form a joint network and contribute 
indistinguishably to the common network effects.  
In the previous section, we obtained the optimal price and profit rate assuming the release 
time of product B is given. We now derive the optimal release time of product B. Product release 
time is an important strategic decision for Vendor B because it determines the product quality 
upon release, which, as shown in (8) and (9), in turn affects the vendor’s equilibrium price, 
market share, and profit rate. Furthermore, the release time also determines the remaining service 
time for Vendor B in the finite demand window.  
Unlike in the previous section where the objective is to maximize the profit rates, here the 
vendor aims to maximize its total profit for the entire demand window, denoted by Π஻, which 
equals the total revenue, i.e., the product of the profit rate (ߨ஻஽∗) and the duration of service (ܦ −
߬஻), minus the marginal development cost (see Equation (3)). From (8) and (9), it is clear that the 
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functional-form of Vendor B’s profit rate depends on whether the quality of its product is lower 
than that of product A, or, equivalently, whether product B is released before the instant of time 
(߬ா = ∆௤బఒ ) when the qualities of the two products become equal. 
Based on the above discussion and the equilibrium solutions (8) and (9), the optimal release 
time for product B in the full-compatibility scenario can be obtained by maximizing Vendor B’s 
total profit with respect to ߬஻:  
maxఛಳ Π஻(߬஻) = ൜
ݎ[ݍ஺(߬஻) − ݍ஻(߬஻)](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻,  ߬஻ ≤ ߬ா ,ݏ[ݍ஻(߬஻) − ݍ஺(߬஻)](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻,  ߬஻ > ߬ா ,    (10) 
where ݎ = ቀଵିଶఏబଷ ቁ
ଶ and ݏ = ቀଶିఏబଷ ቁ
ଶ.  
As shown above, Vendor B has different objective functions at the two time intervals 
separated by ߬ா, hence we need to examine the two intervals separately.5 When ߬஻ ≤ ߬ா, as 
shown in Figure 3, Π஻ decreases with ߬஻; thus, we have a local optimum ߬஻∗ = 0, implying 
that Vendor B’s best strategy is to release its product at time 0, and its profit is Π୆ = ݎ∆ݍ଴ܦ, 
where ∆ݍ଴ denotes the initial quality gap (at time 0), i.e., Δݍ଴ = ݍ஺଴ − ݍ஻଴.  
 
                                                          
5 In this study we focus on the more likely scenario where product B catches up with product A in quality before the end of the demand window, i.e., ߬ா < ܦ, because the problem is relatively trivial under the less likely scenario ߬ா ≥ ܦ. 
D ߬ௗ ߬ா 0 ߬஻ 
 
 Π஻ 
߬ா = ∆௤బఒ   
߬ௗ = ܦ2 + Δݍ02ߣ − ݇2ߣݏ  
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Figure 3. Vendor B’s Profit as a Function of ࣎࡮ 
When ߬஻ > ߬ா, as shown in Figure 3, there is a parabolic relationship between Π஻ and ߬஻. 
Specifically, when ߬஻ ∈ (߬ா , ߬ௗ] , where ߬ௗ = ஽ଶ + ୼௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ , Vendor B’s profit increases with 
߬஻, attaining a local maximum at ߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ; when ߬஻ ∈ (߬ௗ, ܦ], the profit decreases with ߬஻. 
Therefore, the second locally optimal solution is ߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ. With the two local optima being 
considered, the globally optimal solution for Vendor B is simply the local optimum with the 
higher profit, i.e., Π஻∗ =max{Π஻(0), Π஻(߬ௗ)}, and ߬஻∗ = argmaxఛಳ∈{଴,ఛ೏} {Π஻(߬஻)}.  
We are able to identify the condition under which one local optimum is better than the other. 
The condition contains the following threshold value: 
Δݍത଴ = min ቊܦߣ + ௞௦ + ଶఒ௥௦ − ଶఒ௦ ටݎଶܦଶ + ௞௦஽ఒ + ௞௥஽ఒ + ܦଶݏݎ, ܦߣ − ௞௦ቋ.  
We summarize the derived condition in the proposition below. 
Proposition 1: When the two vendors’ products are fully compatible, if the initial product 
quality gap is above a certain threshold (i.e., ∆ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴), it is optimal for Vendor B to release 
its product at time 0 (i.e., ߬஻∗ = 0). Otherwise (i.e., ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴), it is optimal for Vendor B to 
release the product at ߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ, at which point its quality is higher than that of product A. The 
realized total profits of Vendors A and B during the demand window [0, ܦ] are  
ߎ஺∗ = ൜ݏ∆ݍ଴ܦ,      ∆ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴,ߎ஺ெ∗ + ߎ஺஽∗,  ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴,   
ߎ஻∗ = ቊݎ∆ݍ଴ܦ,                         ߂ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴,஽మ௦ఒସ − ஽௦௱ బଶ − ஽௞ଶ + ௱௤బ
మ௦
ସఒ + ௞మସఒ௦ − ௞௱ బଶఒ , ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴,  
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respectively, where ߎ஺ெ∗ = ߨ஺ெ ቀ஽ଶ + ௱௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ ቁ and ߎ஺஽∗ = ݎߣ ൤ቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ
ଶ − ௞మସఒమ௦మ൨ are 
Vendor A’s profits in the monopoly and duopoly stages within the demand window [0, ܦ], 
respectively, and ߨ஺ெ is Vendor A’s profit rate in the monopoly stage.  
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1.  
Corollary 1: At the local optimum ߬஻∗ = 0, product B has a lower quality (and lower price) than 
product A, whereas at the other local optimum ߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ, product B surpasses product A in 
quality and commands a higher price.  
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 summarize one of the most interesting findings of the present 
research. In practice, we observe that some SaaS vendors such as Revolution Analytics and 
Highrise adopted a low-quality-low-price strategy while others such as SuccessFactors followed 
a high-quality-high-price strategy. Proposition 1 suggests that the preferred strategy of the new 
entrant depends critically on the initial quality gap between the product offerings of the 
incumbent and new entrant. When the initial quality gap is relatively large (recall that product B 
has a lower initial quality than product A at time 0), it is optimal for the new entrant to release its 
product at time 0. Conversely, when the initial quality gap is relatively small, it is optimal for 
Vendor B to continue its product development and release product B at a later time. This result is 
counterintuitive, as one would expect that if the new entrant’s product quality is initially low, 
instead of releasing it immediately, the new entrant might be better off continuing the 
development process to enhance its product quality.  
An explanation for this counterintuitive result is as follows. If the initial quality gap is 
relatively large, it would take the new entrant too long to catch up with the incumbent in product 
quality. Consequently, the new entrant might be better off just serving the lower-end market 
immediately, which we refer to as the instant-release strategy. This is because with subscription-
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based licensing, unlike that of traditional perpetual licensing, vendors could derive more revenue 
by simply being in service for a longer period of time. On the other hand, if the initial quality gap 
is relatively small, the new entrant may be better off adopting a completely different strategy – 
deferring the release of its product and continuing to improve its product quality. We refer to 
such a strategy as the late-release strategy. Compared with the instant-release strategy, the late-
release strategy, if optimal, allows the new entrant to surpass its rival in product quality when 
entering the market, and end up reaping more profit in a shorter service period. 
The mathematical reasoning behind Proposition 1 can be illustrated with Figure 4. The two 
continuous curves in the figure represent Vendor B’s profit functions corresponding to the two 
local maxima illustrated in Figure 3. Specifically, with ߬஻∗ = 0, the profit Π஻(0) increases 
monotonically with ∆ݍ଴. With ߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ, Vendor B’s profit is a quadratic function of the initial 
quality gap Δݍ଴, attaining its theoretical minimum at Δݍ଴ = ܦߣ + ௞௦. However, when Δݍ଴ >
ܦߣ, we find that ߬ௗ is larger than ܦ, which is clearly not feasible. Therefore, with ߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ, the 
profit Π஻(߬ௗ) decreases monotonically with ∆ݍ଴ until Δݍ଴ = ܦߣ. The two curves intersect at 
∆ݍ଴ = Δݍത଴. Clearly, to the left of the intersection point of the curves, since the profit curve 
Π஻(߬ௗ) is above the curve Π஻(0), it is optimal for the new entrant to release its product at 
߬஻∗ = ߬ௗ; to the right of the intersection point, it is optimal to release the product at ߬஻∗ = 0. The 
aforementioned optimal profit curves are depicted using solid lines in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Vendor B’s Profit as a Function of Initial Quality Gap 
Another corollary also follows from Proposition 1.  
Corollary 2: Vendor B’s profit at the equilibrium decreases with ߂ݍ଴ when ߂ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴, and 
increases monotonically when ߂ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴.  
The above corollary suggests that when the instant-release strategy is the optimal choice, the 
new entrant is better off having a lower initial quality at the start of the horizon. This result is 
counterintuitive, as one would think that a higher initial quality would result in a higher profit for 
the new entrant. One possible explanation for this result is as follows. Given that the optimal 
release strategy is instant-release, the new entrant upon release would have a lower product 
quality than the incumbent. Therefore, the new entrant, by having an even lower initial quality, 
can benefit from more product differentiation and less price competition with the incumbent.  
In addition, we identify the following analytical properties based on the comparative statics 
analysis of the equilibrium outcomes. 
Corollary 3: When ∆ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴, we have డ௽ಳ∗డ஽ > 0, డ௽ಳ
∗
డ௱௤బ > 0, డ௽ಲ
∗
డ஽ > 0, and డ௽ಲ
∗
డ௱ బ > 0. 
When ߂ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴, the following properties hold:  
ܦߣ 
Δݍത଴ Δݍ଴ 
Π஻ 
Π஻(߬ௗ) Π஻(0) 
Δݍത଴ = min ቐܦߣ + ݇ݏ +
2ߣݎܦ
ݏ −
2ߣ
ݏ ඨݎ2ܦ2 +
݇ݏܦ
ߣ +
݇ݎܦ
ߣ + ܦ2ݏݎ, ܦߣ −
݇
ݏቑ 
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a. డఛಳ∗డ஽ > 0, డ௽ಳ∗డ஽ ≥ 0, డ௽ಲ∗డ஽ > 0.  
b. డఛಳ∗డ௞ < 0, డ௽ಳ∗డ௞ ≤ 0, డ௽ಲ∗డ௞ < 0.  
c. When ݇ ≤ ݏ߂ݍ଴, we have డఛಳ∗డఒ ≤ 0, డ௽ಳ∗డఒ > 0, డ௽ಲಾ∗డఒ ≤ 0, and డ௽ಲವ∗డఒ > 0;  
when ݇ > ݏ߂ݍ଴, we have డఛಳ∗డఒ > 0, డ௽ಳ
∗
డఒ > 0, డ௽ಲ
∗
డఒ > 0.  
d. డఛಳ∗డ௤ಳబ < 0, డ௽ಳ
∗
డ௤ಳబ > 0, డ௽ಲ
ಾ∗
డ௤ಳబ < 0, and డ௽ಲ
ವ∗
డ௤ಳబ > 0.  
Some of the results in Corollary 3 are noteworthy. For instance, under the condition ߂ݍ଴ ≤
߂ݍത଴, when it is optimal for Vendor B to further improve its product quality after time 0, both 
vendors’ profits increase as the marginal development cost for Vendor B decreases. Although the 
conclusion regarding Vendor B’s profit is intuitive, the one regarding Vendor A’s is not. Further 
examination reveals that Vendor A can benefit from Vendor B’s lower marginal development 
cost for two reasons: (i) with lower marginal development cost, Vendor B will postpone its 
product release, so Vendor A will enjoy a longer monopoly period; (ii) a longer development 
period may allow product B to have a greater quality advantage over product A, leading to more 
product differentiation and hence less price competition between the two vendors, and as a result, 
Vendor A’s profit rate in the duopoly stage can increase.  
Corollary 3 also indicates that, when ߂ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴, with a higher initial product quality ݍ஻଴, 
Vendor B releases its product earlier and achieves a higher profit; the profit for Vendor A, on the 
other hand, is lower in the monopoly stage and higher in the duopoly stage. One possible 
explanation for such changes in Vendor A’s profit is that as product B is released earlier, the 
duration of the monopoly stage is shortened and that of the duopoly stage is extended. 
We also conduct numerical analysis to further investigate the impacts of the initial product 
quality of the new entrant on its profit and optimal release time. Given the discrete nature of the 
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equilibrium solutions, we keep the initial quality gap (∆ݍ଴) close to ߂ݍത଴ in our numerical 
analyses. The default values for the parameters are set at ܦ = 20, ߣ = 0.1, ݇ = 0.1, ߠ଴ = 0, 
ߙ = 1, and ݍ஺଴ = 2. We vary the value of ݍ஻଴ while holding other parameter values constant.  
As shown in Figure 5, Vendor B’s profit curve bears resemblance to that in Figure 4. The 
pattern of the change from the late-release to instant-release of product B is also consistent with 
our theoretical findings. The optimal release time curve shown in Figure 5 demonstrates the 
switching pattern for the two locally optimal solutions as described in Proposition 1.  
 
Figure 5. Impact of Product B’s Initial Quality on Equilibrium Outcomes 
Partially Compatible SaaS Products 
In this section, we analyze a more general scenario where Vendor B has made its product 
partially compatible with product A. Under this scenario, consumers of one product can still 
benefit from the consumer network of the other one, but the intensity of cross-product network 
effects is smaller than that of within-product network effects, i.e., {ߚ஺, ߚ஻} < ߙ. For example, 
although Google Docs and Microsoft Office differ in product features, Google Docs allows users 
to open and edit Microsoft Office files using the Office Compatibility Mode (OCM); thus, 
Google Docs and Microsoft Word partially share each other’s network and can be considered 
partially compatible products.  
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Recall that product B starts with a lower quality, but catches up with product A in quality at a 
later time ߬ா = ∆௤బఒ , which divides the demand window into two intervals, [0, ߬ா), and [߬ா , ܦ]. 
From the equilibrium equations (8) and (9), the market share of product B drops to zero when 
(ݍ஺ − ݍ஻) ∈ ቂ0, ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ஻ + 2ߛ஺)ቃ, and product B captures the entire market when (ݍ஻ − ݍ஺) ∈
ቂ0, ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ஺ + 2ߛ஻) ቃ. Accordingly, the zero-profit release time interval for product B is ߬஻ ∈
ൣ߬ଵ, ߬ா൧, and its winner-take-all time interval is ߬஻ ∈ [߬ா , ߬ଵ ], where ߬ଵ = ௱௤బఒ − ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ ଶఊಲାఊಳఒ , 
and ߬ଵ = ௱௤బఒ + ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ ଶఊಳାఊಲఒ . We summarize the above findings in the lemma below. 
Lemma 2: It is not profitable for Vendor B to release its product in its zero-profit time interval 
ൣ߬ଵ, ߬ா൧. If the vendor releases its product in the winner-take-all time interval (߬ா , ߬ଵ), product A 
will be driven out of the market. The above two time intervals expand with the levels of 
incompatibility between the products (ߛ஺ and ߛ஻).  
Figure 6 shows the zero-profit and winner-take-all release time intervals for the new entrant. 
Apparently, Vendor B should avoid releasing its product in the zero-profit time interval. On the 
other hand, it is worth noting that releasing in the winner-take-all interval may not be the optimal 
strategy for Vendor B either, as it can be shown analytically that an earlier release in [0, ߬ଵ) can 
result in a longer service period and a later release after ߬ଵ can lead to a higher profit rate.  
 
Figure 6. Zero-profit and Winner-Take-All Release Time Intervals for the New Entrant 
Substituting ݍு or ݍ௅ in Equations (8-3) and (9-3) with ݍ஻(߬஻) = ݍ஻଴ + ߣଵ߬஻ or 
ݍ஺(߬஻) = ݍ஺଴ + ߣଶ߬஻, we obtain Vendor B’s profit rate:  
߬ா ܦ ߬ଵ ߬ଵ 
Zero-Profit Region 
0 
Winner-Take-All Region 
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ߨ஻஽∗ =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ଵଽ [(ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)]మ௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳିఊಳିఊಲ , ߬஻ < ߬ଵ,         ߠ଴(ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻ − ݍ஺଴)(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ, ߬ா < ߬஻ < ߬ଵଵ
ଽ
[(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲబ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]మ௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲబିఊಲିఊಳ , ߬ଵ ≤ ߬஻ ≤ ܦ.     
,   (11) 
Vendor B’s profit maximization problem is, therefore, 
maxఛಳ Π஻ =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ଵଽ [(ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)]మ௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳିఊಳିఊಲ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻,   ߬஻ < ߬ଵ,        [ߠ଴(ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻ − ݍ஺଴)(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻, ߬ா < ߬஻ < ߬ଵ,ଵ
ଽ
[(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]మ௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲିఊಲିఊಳ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻,   ߬ଵ ≤ ߬஻ ≤ ܦ.      
 (12) 
s.t. ߬஻ ∈ ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯ ∪ (߬ா , ܦ].              
To obtain the globally optimal solution for problem (12), we first derive the locally optimal 
solutions in two intervals: the low-quality interval ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯ and the high-quality interval (߬ா , ܦ]. 
When ߬஻ ∈ ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯, product B’s quality is lower than that of product A. It can be shown that 
డగಳವ∗డఛಳ < 0 holds in this region, implying that Vendor B’s total profit decreases with ߬஻ when 
߬஻ ∈ ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯. Therefore, ߬஻∗ = 0 is the only one local maximum in the interval ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯.  
As shown in Figure 6, ߬ଵ divides the high-quality interval (߬ா , ܦ] into two sub-intervals: 
൫߬ா , ߬ଵ൯ and [߬ଵ, ܦ]. In ൫߬ா , ߬ଵ൯, the only possible interior local optimal solution is ߬ௗଵ = ஽ଶ +
୼௤బଶఒ − ఊಳ(ଵିఏబ)మା௞ଶఒఏబ(ଵିఏబ) . While a closed-form expression for the optimal solution in [߬ଵ, ܦ] cannot be 
analytically derived for ݇ > 0, we are still able to obtain some interesting analytical findings.  
Let ߬ௗଶ = ஽ସ + ଷ(୼௤బାఊಲାఊಳ)ସఒ + ඥ(஽ఒି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳ)(஽ఒି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳା௫)ସఒ , where ݔ =
଼(ଵିఏబ)ଶିఏబ (2ߛ஺ + ߛ஻) − 8ߛ஺ − 8ߛ஻. Regarding Vendor B’s release strategy, we have the following 
proposition.  
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Proposition 2: When the two products are partially compatible, if their initial quality gap is 
sufficiently large, Vendor B should release its products instantly; otherwise, it is better off 
adopting the late-release strategy.6 In the latter scenario, Vendor B should release its product 
no later than time ߬ଵ or ߬ௗଶ, whichever occurs later, i.e., ߬ா < ߬஻∗ ≤ max{߬ଵ, ߬ௗଶ}.  
Corollary 4 follows immediately from Proposition 2.  
Corollary 4: The following two types of late-release strategies are possible. Type I: Vendor B 
releases its products in [߬ଵ, ߬ௗଶ), and Vendors A and B serve the low-end and high-end markets, 
respectively; Type II: Vendor B releases its product in the winner-take-all region (߬ா , ߬ଵ), 
driving product A out of market.  
Proposition 2 is in line with Proposition 1 obtained for the full-compatibility scenario. We 
analytically show that in the partial-compatibility scenario, even with asymmetric incompatibility, 
the instant-release strategy, i.e., entering the market at time zero, and the late-release strategy, i.e., 
releasing product B after it surpasses product A in quality, are still the only two options that Vendor 
B should consider, and the best market entry timing still depends on the initial quality gap.  
As for the two types of late release strategies outlined in Corollary 4, which one is preferable 
to the new entrant depends on the degree of incompatibility between the two competing products. 
As shown in Figure 7, as the degrees of incompatibility (ߛ஺ and ߛ஻) increases, Vendor B’s optimal 
late-release strategy changes from Type I to Type II. 
                                                          
6 The equilibrium prices and demands of the two vendors corresponding to different release strategies are 
summarized in Section A.9 of Online Supplements. 
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Figure 7. Optimal Release Strategy 
(Parameter Values: ܦ = 20, ݇ = 0.1, ߙ = 0.2, ߣ = 0.1, ߠ଴ = 0, ݍ஺଴ = 2, ݍ஻଴ = 1.45) 
It is also worth noting that Corollary 1 still holds in this partial-compatibility scenario. That 
is, the instant-release strategy is a low-quality-low-price strategy, whereas the late-release 
strategy is a high-quality-high-price strategy.  
In addition, we conduct comparative statics analyses to investigate how the levels of 
incompatibility affect the price, demand, and profit of the new entrant, and summarize the results 
in the lemma below.  
Lemma 3: When Vendor B adopts the instant-release strategy, its profit decreases with the level 
of incompatibility (in either direction). When Vendor B adopts the late-release strategy, its profit 
increases with the level of incompatibility from product B to product A, but decreases with the 
level of incompatibility in the other direction.  
Table 3 below provides a more detailed summary of the impact of the levels of 
incompatibility on the equilibrium price, demand, and profit for Vendor B.  
Instant Release 
0.10 
0.08 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
Late Release (Type I) 
ߛ஻ 
ߛ஺ 
Late Release (Type II) 
0    0.02    0.04    0.06    0.08    0.10 
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Table 3. Impacts of ࢽ࡭ or ࢽ࡮ on Equilibrium Outcome for Vendor B 
Changes in 
levels of 
incompatibility 
Instant-Release 
Strategy 
Late-Release Strategy 
Type I Type II 
݌஻஽∗ ܳ஻஽∗ Π஻∗  ݌஻஽∗ ܳ஻஽∗ Π஻∗  ݌஻஽∗ ܳ஻஽∗ Π஻∗  
ߛ஺ increases ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ − − − 
ߛ஻ increases ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ − ↑ 
 In order to determine the optimal release time for product B, we need to first calculate 
Vendor B’s total profit corresponding to the instant-release and late-release strategies, 
respectively, and then choose the one with the higher profit. Since the optimal release time for 
the late-release strategy is not analytically tractable, we resort to numerical methods to obtain the 
globally optimal solution. We set the parameter values at ܦ = 20, ߣ = 0.1, ݍ஺଴ = 2, ߠ଴ = 0, 
ߙ = 0.5, ݇ = 0.1, ݍ஻଴ = 1.25, and ߛ஺, ߛ஻ ∈ [0,0.5]. The impact of the level of incompatibility 
on Vendor B’s optimal market entry strategy and profit are shown in Figure 8. 
  
(a) Optimal Market Entry Strategy (b) Maximal Profit 
Figure 8. Optimal Market Entry Strategy and Maximal Profit of Vendor B 
Figure 8(a) shows that the new entrant prefers the instant-release strategy when both ߛ஺ and 
ߛ஻ are relatively small, and the late-release strategy when both ߛ஺ and ߛ஻ are relatively large 
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The explanation is as follows. According to Lemma 2, an increase in ߛ஺ and ߛ஻ will lead to the 
expansion of the zero-profit region for the low-quality vendor. When the values of ߛ஺ and ߛ஻ 
are sufficiently large, Vendor B, who has a lower initial quality, would fall within the zero-profit 
region if the instant-release strategy was adopted; thus, Vendor B would prefer to adopt the late-
release strategy. As shown in Figure 8(b), Vendor B’s profit obtained in the instant-release 
strategy decreases when ߛ஺ increases, and that obtained in the late-release strategy increases 
with ߛ஻. These observations are in line with our analytical findings in Lemma 3 and Table 3.  
Model Extensions 
In this section, we explore four extended models (Model Extensions I-IV), with one key 
assumption being relaxed in each of the models. Due to space constraints, we choose to present 
only Model Extensions I, which addresses the issues of switching cost, in the main text. We 
relegate the detailed analysis of the other three extended models (Model Extensions II-IV) to the 
Online Supplements, and retain only a summary of the models at the end of this section. 
Model Extension I: A Model with Switching Cost  
In the previous sections, we implicitly assume that the cost for consumers to switch from product 
A to product B is negligible. In some markets, however, switching cost could be significant for 
end users due to differences in functionalities, interfaces, platforms, and data formats of the two 
SaaS products. Therefore, it may seem reasonable to assume that a higher level of compatibility 
is necessarily associated with a lower switching cost. In practice, however, an incumbent can 
inflate the switching cost regardless of the level of compatibility between a competitor’s product 
and its own. For instance, customers can upload data to Amazon Web Services (AWS) for free, 
but have to pay to take data out of it (Butler 2013), which makes it difficult for the customers to 
switch to the competing vendors who provide compatible services  
35 
In this subsection, we take into account users’ switching cost and re-examine the two 
vendors’ decisions on product quality, pricing, and entry timing. As before, we first derive the 
equilibrium prices of the two products and then analyze Vendor B’s optimal market entry timing. 
We use ߠ෠ெ to denote the type of consumer who is indifferent between subscribing and not 
subscribing to product A in the monopoly stage, and ߠ෠ (ߠ෠ ≥ ߠ෠ெ) to denote the type of consumer 
who subscribes to product A before ߬஻ and is indifferent between switching to product B and 
continuing to use product A after ߬஻. With switching cost, denoted by ܿௌ, taken into 
consideration, consumers will revise the net utility obtained from product B. We assume that ܿௌ 
is linearly increasing with the duration of time the users have been using the product, i.e.,  
ܿௌ = ܿ଴(߬஻ − ߬஺),           (13) 
where ܿ଴ is a positive constant, and ߬஺, ߬஺ < 0, is the release time of product A.  
The indifferent consumer type ߠ෠ satisfies the following equation: 
൫ߠ෠ݍ஺(߬஻) − ݌஺஽ + ߙܳ஺஽ + ߚ஻ܳ஻஽൯(ܦ − ߬஻) = ൫ߠ෠ݍ஻(߬஻) − ݌஻஽ + ߙܳ஻஽ + ߚ஺ܳ஺஽൯(ܦ − ߬஻) − ܿௌ,  (14) 
Solving Equation (14) yields  
ߠ෠ = ௣ಳವି௣ಲವାఊಲொಲವିఊಳொಳವ௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ) + ௖ೞ൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯(஽ିఛಳ).     (15) 
To take into account switching cost, we need to know how the market is divided between the 
two vendors. Other than the three types of market segmentation scenarios shown in Figure 9 
below, switching cost doesn’t affect the market size of the two vendors. Therefore, we focus on 
these three types of market segmentation.  
 
(a) Case I: ݍ஻(߬஻) > ݍ஺(߬஻) and ߠ෠ெ ≤ ߠ෠஽ 
ߠ෠ 
Vendor A 
ߠ଴ 1 ߠ෠஽ ߠ෠ெ 
Vendor B 
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(b) Case II: ݍ஻(߬஻) > ݍ஺(߬஻) and ߠ෠஽ < ߠ෠ெ < ߠ෠ 
 
(c) Case III: ݍ஻(߬஻) < ݍ஺(߬஻) and ߠ෠ெ < ߠ෠ 
Figure 9. Market Segmentation when Switching Cost is Considered 
Recall that ߠ෠ெ is the type of consumer who is indifferent between subscribing and not 
subscribing to product A in the monopoly stage and ߠ෠஽ is the consumer type that derives 
identical net utility from products A and B in the duopoly stage when switching cost is not 
considered. From ߠ෠஽ = ௣ಳವି௣ಲವାఊಲொಲವିఊಳொಳವ௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)  and ߠ෠ = ௣ಳ
ವି௣ಲವାఊಲொಲವିఊಳொಳವ௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ) + ௖ೞ൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯(஽ିఛಳ), 
we conclude that ߠ෠ is larger than ߠ෠஽ when ݍ஻(߬஻) > ݍ஺(߬஻). To fully understand the market 
segmentation, we also need to compare the values of ߠ෠஽ and ߠ෠ெ, where ߠ෠ெ is assumed to be 
exogenous in this section.  
As shown in Figure 9 above, before Vendor B enters the market, all consumers located in 
ൣߠ෠ெ, 1൧ would subscribe to product A. In Case I, after product B is released, the consumers in 
ൣߠ଴, ߠ෠൧ will continue to use product A, while those in ൫ߠ෠, 1൧ will switch to product B. In Case 
II, the market is divided into four segments after product B is released, the consumers located in 
൫ߠ෠, 1൧ will switch to product B. In the meantime, the consumers in ൣߠ଴, ߠ෠ெ൯ start their new 
subscription. Specifically, those in ൣߠ଴, ߠ෠஽൧ will subscribe to product A, and those in ൫ߠ෠஽ , ߠ෠ெ൯ 
will subscribe to product B. In Case III, consumers in ൫ߠ෠, 1൧ will subscribe to product A, and 
those in ൣߠ଴, ߠ෠൧ will subscribe to product B in the duopoly stage.  
Vendor B 
ߠ෠ 
Vendor B Vendor A Vendor A 
ߠ଴ 1 ߠ෠஽ ߠ෠ெ 
ߠ෠஽ 
Vendor B 
ߠ଴ 1 ߠ෠ ߠ෠ெ 
Vendor A 
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For each of the three cases shown in Figure 9, there is a set of profit rate functions that leads 
to an equilibrium. The details of the equilibria are provided in Section A.13 of Online 
Supplements.  
The closed-form expression for product B’s optimal release time cannot be obtained. Thus, 
we conduct numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of switching cost on the Vendor B’s 
pricing, quality, and entry timing decisions. We set the parameter values at ܦ = 20, ߣ = 0.1, 
ݍ஺଴ = 2, ߬஺ = −2, ߠ଴ = 0, ߙ = 0.2, ݇ = 0.1, ݍ஻଴ ∈ {1.3,1.5,1.7}, ߛ஺ = 0.1, ߛ஻ = 0, and 
ܿ଴ = 0, 0.02, 0.04, … ,0.2, with increments of 0.02.  
Figure 10 shows how Vendor B’s market entry timing and total profit change with the 
switching cost. From this figure, we can draw the following conclusions. First, the results 
concerning the optimal release time suggest that when the initial quality gap is relatively small 
(e.g., ݍ஻଴ = 1.7), the late-release strategy is optimal for the new entrant. When the initial quality 
gap is relatively large (e.g., ݍ஻଴ = 1.3), the vendor is better off adopting the instant-release 
strategy. When the initial quality gap is moderate (e.g., ݍ஻଴ = 1.5), as the switching cost 
becomes higher, Vendor B’s optimal strategy changes from late-release to instant-release. 
Therefore, the effect of a higher switching cost on the release strategy appears to be similar to 
that of a larger initial quality gap. Second, Vendor B’s profit decreases monotonically as the 
switching cost increases, indicating the increasing market power of the incumbent over the new 
entrant.  
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Figure 10. Vendor B’s Optimal Release Time and Profit as Functions of ࢉ૙ 
Figure 11 provides a more complete picture of one of the most important conclusions of the 
present research. The solid line in the figure represents the threshold quality gap that divides the 
space into the late-release region and the instant-release region. As shown in the figure, 
regardless of the levels of switching cost, if the initial quality gap is sufficiently small, i.e., ݍ஻଴ 
is sufficiently close to ݍ஺଴, the late-release strategy is always preferred by the new entrant; when 
the initial quality gap ߂ݍ଴ is above a certain threshold, the optimal release strategy changes to 
instant-release. Furthermore, as the switching cost increases, the threshold value that separates 
the late-release and the instant-release regions drops, indicating that the instant-release strategy 
becomes more preferable to the consumers when the switching cost is higher.  
In summary, our key findings in the previous sections remain valid even when consumers’ 
switching cost is considered, and with a higher switching cost the new entrant is more likely to 
adopt the instant-release strategy.  
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 Figure 11. Release Strategy under Different Combinations of ࢤࢗ૙ and ࢉ૙ 
Summary of Model Extensions II-IV 
To check the robustness of our main findings, we also explore three other model extensions 
(Model Extensions II-IV), details of which are provided in Online Supplements. Specifically, in 
Model Extension II (Section A.14 of Online Supplements), we analyze the case in which the 
assumption of linear development cost is relaxed and the marginal development cost is assumed 
to be a quadratic function of development time. In Model Extension III (Section A.15 of Online 
Supplements), we investigate the scenario where the assumption of equal post-release quality 
improvement rate is relaxed and the two vendors have unequal post-release quality improvement 
rates. In Model Extension IV (Section A.16 of Online Supplements), we study the scenario 
where the full market coverage assumption is relaxed and the market is assumed to be partially 
covered. We find that our main results on market entry strategy remain valid under these 
extensions.  
Conclusion and Future Research 
Software-as-a-service (SaaS), a new software licensing and delivery model widely considered a 
convenient and cost-efficient alternative to the traditional on-premises model, has recently 
received considerable attention from both industry and academia. The market of SaaS has 
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expanded rapidly and attracted a large number of software vendors, leading to intense 
competition among SaaS vendors and unfavorable market conditions for new entrants. To 
survive and thrive in the competitive market, new SaaS vendors need to strategically make 
market entry decisions. Unfortunately, the extant literature on SaaS provides little insight in this 
regard. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt has yet been made to explore the 
competition between a new entrant and an incumbent vendor in a SaaS market. Our study aims 
to fill this gap in the literature. Specifically, we employ a game-theoretic framework to 
investigate the scenario where a new SaaS vendor seeks to enter the market and compete with an 
incumbent vendor providing substitutable SaaS products, making strategic market decisions on 
product quality, pricing, and entry timing.  
The main findings of this research are as follows. First, we find that the new entrant’s 
optimal decision on entry timing depends on the initial quality gap between the competing 
products. Specifically, if the quality of the new product is close to that of the existing one, the 
new entrant would prefer to adopt a late-release strategy, i.e., deferring the release of the new 
product in order to further improve it and eventually surpass the existing product in quality; 
otherwise, the new entrant would prefer to adopt an instant-release strategy, i.e., releasing the 
product immediately. We find that instant-release and late-release lead to a low-quality-low-price 
strategy, and a high-quality-high-price strategy, respectively. Second, if the two products are 
partially compatible, when the new entrant adopts the instant-release strategy, a higher level of 
incompatibility (in either direction) will reduce its profit, and as a result, the new entrant may 
find it unprofitable to employ the instance-release strategy if the level of incompatibility is 
sufficiently high. When the new entrant adopts the late-release strategy, its profit increases with 
the level of incompatibility from its product to the incumbent’s, but may decrease with the level 
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of incompatibility in the other direction. Finally, we show that our main findings remain valid 
even when factors such as consumers’ switching cost are taken into consideration.  
Our research has important practical implications for SaaS vendors. First of all, the closed-
form analytical solutions that we obtain for the optimal entry timing and pricing can be used as 
guidelines for SaaS vendors to make strategic market decisions, especially when they are seeking 
to enter a market occupied by an incumbent vendor. For instance, the proposed instant-release 
and late-release strategies could help the new entrant determine the best timing of market entry. 
It is important to note that, regardless of which release strategy is chosen, the new entrant needs 
to make sure that it sufficiently differentiates its product from the incumbent’s in quality. In 
addition, our analyses regarding the impact of degrees of incompatibility on equilibrium 
outcomes can provide some managerial guidelines for the new SaaS vendors when deciding to 
what extent its product should be compatible with the existing product.  
We have to acknowledge that our study, like any other research endeavor, is not without its 
limitations. One limitation is that we assume the incumbent vendor’s initial product quality is 
exogenous in our models. One possible direction for future study is to endogenize the 
incumbent’s own market entry timing and hence its initial product quality, and derive the optimal 
market entry timing, pricing, and quality decisions for two competing SaaS vendors. A second 
limitation is that the current study analyzes the competition between two SaaS vendors primarily 
from the new vendor’s perspective, and the incumbent is more passive than the entrant in its 
response to competition and can only compete along the pricing dimension. In an extension 
study, it would be interesting to analyze a more comprehensive scenario where vendors compete 
along both product quality and pricing dimensions. A related limitation of the present study is 
that we assume the incumbent does not employ any deterrence strategy when the market entry of 
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a new SaaS vendor is imminent. A future study could take into consideration possible short-term 
entry deterrence actions the incumbent may take, such as lowering the price of subscription and 
allocating more resources on quality improvement, and reexamine the market entry strategy for 
new vendors. Furthermore, an interesting phenomenon often observed in the SaaS market is that 
some vendors offer their product for free (e.g., Google Docs vs. Office 365) in exchange for other 
benefits such as a larger customer base or sales of complementary products. While it is beyond 
the scope of the present study to address this issue, we believe it can be a potential avenue for 
future research. 
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Online Supplements 
A.1 Proof of Equilibrium Solutions (8) and (9)  
ቐ
max௣ಽವ ߨ௅ = ݌௅஽൫ߠ෠஽ − ߠ଴൯,max௣ಹವ ߨு = ݌ு஽൫1 − ߠ෠஽൯,
        (7) 
s.t. ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠஽ ≤ 1,           
݌௅஽ ≥ 0, ݌ு஽ ≥ 0.           
Substituting ߠ෠஽ = ௣ಹವି௣ಽವିఏబఊಽିఊಹ௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಹିఊಽ into (7), and solving the first order conditions yields  
ቐ ݌ு஽∗ =
(ଶିఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಽାఊಹ)
ଷ ,
݌௅஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)ଷ ,
     (8-1) 
and  
ۖە
۔
ۖۓߠ෠஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵାఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵାଶఏబ)ఊಽି(ఏబାଶ)ఊಹ௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,
ܳு஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଶିఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಽାఊಹ)௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,   
ܳ௅஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵିଶఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ .  
   (8-2) 
Thus, the two vendors’ profits are  
൞ ߨு
஽∗ = ଵଽ ൣ(ଶିఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಽାఊಹ)൧
మ
௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,
ߨ௅஽∗ = ଵଽ ൣ(ଵିଶఏబ)൫௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)൧
మ
௤ಹ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಽ(ఛಳ)ିఊಽିఊಹ ,
    (8-3) 
The prices and demands of the two vendors in this equilibrium are positive if and only if 
൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ ≥  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு).  
When ൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ <  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு), the price of Vendor L in Equilibrium (8) is 
negative, hence we have a new equilibrium solution by setting ݌௅஽∗ = 0:  
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ቊ݌ு஽∗ = ߠ଴൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ + ߛு(1 − ߠ଴),݌௅஽∗ = 0,                                 (9-1) 
ቐߠ
෠஽∗ = ߠ଴,   ܳு஽∗ = 1 − ߠ଴ܳ௅஽∗ = 0.    
,           (9-2) 
ቊߨு஽∗ = ߠ଴൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛு(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ,ߨ௅஽∗ = 0.                                      (9-3) 
                      □□ 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1  
After product B’ release, the quality difference of the two products remains unchanged because 
the two vendors have the same post-release quality improvement rate. Therefore, from equations 
(8) and (9), the equilibrium prices and profit rates for the two products remain constant in the 
duopoly stage. In addition, equilibrium price and profit rates for the two product increase with 
quality difference of the two products upon the release of product B because డగಹವ∗డ୼௤ ≥ 0 and 
డగಽವ∗డ୼௤ ≥ 0 hold (߂ݍ = ݍு(߬୆) − ݍ௅(߬୆)).              
      □□ 
A.3 Proof of Observation 1  
From equilibrium (9-1) through (9-3), in the zero-profit region, i.e., ൫ݍு(߬஻) − ݍ௅(߬஻)൯ <
 ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு), the price and profit rate of Vendor L are both zero. Since ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ is positive, 
any increase in ߛு or ߛ௅ would expand this zero-profit region of Vendor L.    □□ 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1  
maxఛಳ Π஻ = ൜
ݎ[ݍ஺−ݍ஻(߬஻)](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻,  ߬஻ ≤ ߬ா ,ݏ[ݍ஻(߬஻) − ݍ஺](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻,  ߬஻ > ߬ா .   (10) 
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The necessary conditions for ߬ௗ to be the globally optimal solution of (10) are  
߬ா < ߬ௗ < ܦ,          (A1) 
Π஻(߬ௗ) > Π஻(0).         (A2) 
Condition (A1) ensures that ߬ௗ belongs to the feasible region (߬ா , ܦ), and (A2) is needed 
because ߬ௗ is the more profitable solution than 0.  
Since ߬ா = ୼௤బఒ  and ߬ௗ = ஽ଶ + ୼௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ , condition (A1) is equivalent to  
∆ݍ଴ < ܦߣ − ௞௦.  
The profit difference between the two local optimal solutions is  
Π஻(߬ௗ) − Π஻(0) = ௦ସఒ ߂ݍ଴ଶ − ஽௦ଶ ߂ݍ଴ − ௞ଶఒ ߂ݍ଴ − ݎܦ∆ݍ଴ + ஽మ௦ఒସ + ௞మସ௦ − ஽௞ଶ .  
It can be shown that Π஻(߬ௗ) > Π஻(0) leads to  
Δݍ଴ < Δݍ଴ᇱ  or Δݍ଴ > Δݍ଴ᇱᇱ,  
where Δݍ଴ᇱ = ܦߣ + ௞௦ + ଶఒ௥஽௦ − ଶఒ௦ ටݎଶܦଶ + ௞௦஽ఒ + ௞௥஽ఒ + ܦଶݏݎ and Δݍ଴ᇱᇱ = ܦߣ + ௞௦ + ଶఒ௥஽௦ +
ଶఒ
௦ ටݎଶܦଶ + ௞௦஽ఒ + ௞௥஽ఒ + ܦଶݏݎ.  
Note that Δݍ଴ᇱᇱ > ܦߣ − ௞௦; thus, Δݍ଴ > Δݍ଴ᇱᇱ violates condition (A1). Therefore, conditions (A1) 
and (A2) hold only when Δݍ଴ satisfies  
Δݍ଴ ≤ Δݍത଴,  
where Δݍത଴ = min ቊܦߣ + ௞௦ + ଶఒ௥஽௦ − ଶఒ௦ ටݎଶܦଶ + ௞௦஽ఒ + ௞௥஽ఒ + ܦଶݏݎ, ܦߣ − ௞௦ቋ.  
Therefore, if Δݍ଴ ≤ Δݍത଴, ߬ௗ is the optimal release time; otherwise, Vendor B should release 
its product at time 0. Correspondingly, the profits of the two vendors are  
Π஻∗ = ቊݎ∆ݍ଴ܦ,                            ߂ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴,஽మ௦ఒସ − ஽௦௱௤బଶ − ஽௞ଶ + ௱௤బ
మ௦
ସఒ + ௞మସఒ௦ − ௞௱௤బଶఒ , ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴,  
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Π஺∗ = ൜ݏ∆ݍ଴ܦ,      ∆ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴,Π஺ெ∗ + Π஺஽∗,  ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴,   
where Π஺ெ∗ = ߨ஺ெ∗ ቀ஽ଶ + ௱௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ௦ቁ and Π஺஽∗ = ݎߣ ൤ቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ
ଶ − ௞మସఒమ௦మ൨.     □□ 
A.5 Proof of Corollary 1  
When ߬஻∗ = 0, the prices of product A and B take the forms, 
ቐ ݌஺஽∗ =
ଶିఏబଷ Δݍ଴,
݌஻஽∗ = ଵିଶఏబଷ Δݍ଴.
  
The condition ߠ଴ ∈ ቂ0, ଵଶቁ leads to ଶିఏబଷ > ଵିଶఏబଷ ; thus, the equilibrium price of product B is 
lower than that of product A.  
When Vendor B release its product at ߬஻∗ = ஽ଶ + ௱௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ௦, the prices of product A and B 
become 
ቐ݌஺஽∗ =
ଵିଶఏబଷ (ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻∗ − ݍ஺଴),
݌஻஽∗ = ଶିఏబଷ (ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻∗ − ݍ஺଴).
  
Since ଶିఏబଷ > ଵିଶఏబଷ , we conclude that the price of product B is higher than that of product A 
when the new entrant adopts the late-release strategy.          
 □□ 
A.6 Proof of Corollary 2  
As stated in Proposition 1, when ߂ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴, Vendor B’s profit is given by  
Π஻∗ = ஽మ௦ఒସ − ஽௦௱௤బଶ − ஽௞ଶ + ௱௤బ
మ௦
ସఒ + ௞మସఒ௦ − ௞௱ బଶఒ , 
which is a quadric function of ߂ݍ଴. As ߂ݍ଴ increases, Π஻∗  reaches its minimum at ߂ݍ଴ = ஽ఒ +
௞
௦. Since ߂ݍത଴ < ஽ఒ + ௞௦, Π஻∗  decreases with ߂ݍ଴ when ߂ݍ଴ ≤ ߂ݍത଴.  
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When ߂ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴, the profit of Vendor B is given by 
Π஻∗ = ݎ∆ݍ଴ܦ,  
which is an increasing function of ∆ݍ଴. Therefore, Vendor B’s profit increases monotonically 
with ߂ݍ଴ when ߂ݍ଴ > ߂ݍത଴.               □□ 
A.7 Proof of Corollary 3  
(1) When ∆ݍ଴ > Δݍത଴, the two vendors’ profits are given by 
൜Π஺∗ = ݏ∆ݍ଴ܦ,Π஻∗ = ݎ∆ݍ଴ܦ. 
Thus, 
డஈಳ∗డ஽ = ݏΔݍ଴ > 0, డஈಳ
∗
డ୼௤బ = ݏܦ > 0, డஈಲ
∗
డ஽ = ݎΔݍ଴ > 0, and డஈಲ
∗
డ୼௤బ = ݎܦ > 0.  
(2) When ∆ݍ଴ ≤ Δݍത଴, the vendors’ profits are  
൝Π஺
∗ = Π஺ெ∗ + Π஺஽∗,                      
Π஻∗ = ஽మ௦ఒସ − ஽௦௱௤బଶ − ஽௞ଶ + ௱௤బ
మ௦
ସఒ + ௞మସఒ௦ − ௞௱ బଶఒ ,  
where Π஺ெ∗ = ߨ஺ெ ቀ஽ଶ + ௱௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ௦ቁ and Π஺஽∗ = ݎߣ ൤ቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ
ଶ − ௞మସఒమ௦మ൨,  
and the optimal release time is ߬஻∗ = ஽ଶ + ୼௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ௦.  
a. The first order derivatives of the optimal release time (߬஻∗ ) and the profits (Π஺∗ , Π஻∗ ) with 
respect to the demand window ܦ are  
డఛಳ∗డ஽ = ଵଶ,  
డஈಳ∗డ஽ = ௦ቀ஽ఒି୼௤బି
ೖೞቁଶ , 
డஈಲ∗డ஽ = గಲ
ಾ
ଶ + ݎ ஽ఒି୼௤బଶ . 
It is obvious that డఛಳ∗డ஽ > 0. From ∆ݍ଴ ≤ Δݍത଴ we have ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ܦߣ − ௞௦, i.e., ܦߣ − ∆ݍ଴ −
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௞
௦ ≥ 0. Hence, we have డஈಳ
∗
డ஽ ≥ 0 and డஈಲ
∗
డ஽ > 0.  
b. The first order derivatives of the optimal release time (߬஻∗ ) and the profits (Π஺∗ , Π஻∗ ) with 
respect to the marginal development cost ݇ are  
డఛಳ∗డ௞ = − ଵଶఒ௦,  
డஈಳ∗డ௞ = − ଵଶఒ ቀܦߣ − ௞௦ + Δݍ଴ቁ, 
డஈಲ∗డ௞ = − గಲ
ಾ
ଶఒ௦ − ௥ఒ௞ଶఒమ௦మ. 
It is obvious that డఛಳ∗డ௞ < 0 and డஈಲ
∗
డ௞ < 0. From ∆ݍ଴ ≤ Δݍത଴, we have ∆ݍ଴ ≤ ܦߣ − ௞௦; 
thus, ܦߣ − ௞௦ + Δݍ଴ ≥ 0. Therefore, we conclude డஈಳ
∗
డ௞ ≤ 0.  
c. The first order derivatives of the optimal release time (߬஻∗ ) with respect to ߣ is  
డఛಳ∗డఒ = − ୼௤బଶఒమ + ௞ଶ௦ఒమ. 
If ݇ > ݏ߂ ଴, డఛಳ∗డఒ  is positive; otherwise (݇ ≤ ݏ߂ݍ଴,), it is negative.  
Based on the Envelope Theorem, from Π஻∗ = ݏ[ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻∗ − ݍ஺](ܦ − ߬஻∗ ) − ݇߬஻∗ , we 
have డஈಳ∗డఒ = ݏ߬஻∗ (ܦ − ߬஻∗ ), in which ߬஻∗ = ஽ଶ + ୼௤బଶఒ − ௞ଶఒ௦ is smaller than ܦ. Hence, 
డஈಳ∗డఒ > 0 holds. 
When ݇ ≤ ݏ߂ݍ଴, the monopoly stage becomes shorter as ߣ increases. Therefore, 
Vendor A’s profit in the monopoly stage declines. However, its profit obtained in the 
duopoly stage increases because డஈಲವ∗డఒ = ݎ ൤ቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ
ଶ − ௞మସఒమ௦మ൨ + ݎߣ ቂቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ ௱௤బఒమ +
௞మ
ଶఒయ௦మቃ > 0.  
When ݇ > ݏ߂ ଴, as ߣ increases, the monopoly stage becomes longer, and Vendor A’s 
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profit in the monopoly stage increases, i.e., డஈಲಾ∗డఒ > 0. In addition, డஈಲ
ವ∗
డఒ =
ݎ ൤ቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ
ଶ − ௞మସఒమ௦మ൨ + ݎߣ ቂቀ஽ଶ − ௱௤బଶఒ ቁ ௱௤బఒమ + ଶ௞మସఒయ௦మቃ > 0 still holds. Therefore, the total 
profit of Vendor A increases with ߣ, i.e., డஈಲ∗డఒ > 0.  
d. It is obvious that డఛಳ∗డ௤ಳబ = − ଵଶఒ < 0 and డஈಳ
∗
డ௤ಳబ = ஽௦ଶ − ௦୼௤బଶఒ + ௞ଶఒ > 0 because ∆ݍ଴ ≤
ܦߣ − ௞௦. The profit of Vendor A in the monopoly stage is Π஺ெ = ߨ஺ெ߬஻∗ . With a larger 
ݍ஻଴, Vendor B releases its products earlier, indicating that Vendor A has a shorter 
monopoly stage; thus, its profit in the monopoly stage decreases, i.e. డஈಲಾ∗డ௤ಳబ < 0. 
Furthermore, the first order derivatives of Π஺஽∗ with respect to ݍ஻଴ is డஈಲವ∗డ௤ಳబ =
௥
ଶ ቀܦ − ୼௤బఒ ቁ. Because ∆ݍ଴ < ܦߣ − ௞௦, we have డஈಲ
ವ∗
డ௤ಳబ > 0.       □□ 
A.8 Proof of Lemma 2  
From the equilibrium outcomes (8) and (9), if ߬஻ ∈ ൣ߬ଵ, ߬ா൧, Vendor B’s profit rate is zero; thus 
it is not profitable for Vendor B to release its product in this zero-profit region. If Vendor B 
releases its product in its winner-take-all region (߬ா , ߬ଵ), the demand of Vendor A drops to zero, 
i.e., product A is driven out of market. Because பఛಶபఊಹ = 0, பఛభபఊಹ > 0, and பఛభபఊಹ < 0, both regions 
expand as ߛு increase. Similarly, the two regions expand as ߛ௅ increases (பఛಶபఊಽ = 0, பఛభபఊಽ > 0, 
and பఛభபఊಽ < 0).                   □□ 
A.9 Equilibrium Prices and Demands Corresponding to Different Release Strategies  
a. When Vendor B adopts the instant-release strategy,  
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ቐ ݌஺஽∗ =
(ଶିఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಳାఊಲ)ଷ ,
݌஻஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)ଷ ,
        (A3) 
ቐ ܳ஺
஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଶିఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಳାఊಲ)୼௤బିఊಳିఊಲ ,
ܳ஻஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵିଶఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)୼௤బିఊಳିఊಲ .
       (A4) 
b. When Vendor B adopts the late-release strategy and ߬஻∗ ∈ ൫߬ா , ߬ଵ൯, 
ቊ ݌஺஽∗ = 0,                      ݌஻஽∗ = ߠ଴(ߣ߬஻∗ − Δݍ଴) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ଴),      (A5) 
ቊܳ஺஽∗ = 0,    ܳ஻஽∗ = 1 − ߠ଴.           (A6) 
c. When Vendor B adopts the late-release strategy and ߬஻∗ ∈ [߬ଵ, ܦ],  
ቐ݌஺஽∗ =
(ଵିଶఏబ)(ఒఛಳ∗ ି୼௤బ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ଷ ,
݌஻஽∗ = (ଶିఏబ)(ఒఛಳ∗ ି୼௤బ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ଷ ,
      (A7) 
ቐܳ஺
஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵିଶఏబ)(ఒఛಳ
∗ ି୼௤బ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ఒఛಳ∗ ି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳ ,
ܳ஻஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଶିఏబ)(ఒఛಳ
∗ ି୼௤బ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ఒఛಳ∗ ି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳ .
      (A8) 
□□ 
A.10 Proof of Proposition 2  
From equilibrium solutions (8) and (9), if Vendor B adopts the instant-release strategy, its 
optimal price, demand, and profit are given by 
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ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ݌஻஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)ଷ ,   
ܳ஻஽∗ = ଵଷ (ଵିଶఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)୼௤బିఊಳିఊಲ ,   
Π஻ଵ∗ = ଵଽ [(ଵିଶఏబ)୼௤బି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)]మ୼௤బିఊಳିఊಲ ܦ.
  
Then, we have డஈಳ∗డ୼௤బ > 0, because డ௣ಳ
ವ∗
డ୼௤బ > 0 and డொಳ
ವ∗
డ୼௤బ > 0. 
When Vendor B releases its products at ߬̂ (߬̂ > ߬ா),  
a. If ߬̂ ∈ ൫߬ா , ߬ଵ൯, the profit of Vendor B is given by 
Π஻ = [ߠ଴(ߣ߬̂ − Δݍ଴)(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ](ܦ − ߬̂) − ݇߬̂,  
which decreases with ߂ݍ଴. 
b. If ߬̂ ∈ [߬ଵ, ܦ], the profit of Vendor B is given by 
Π஻ = ଵଽ [(ଶିఏబ)(ఒఛොି୼௤బ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]మఒఛොି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳ (ܦ − ߬̂) − ݇߬̂.  
Then, we have 
డஈಳడ୼௤బ = (஽ିఛො)[(ଶିఏబ)(ఒఛොି୼௤బ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]ଽ ଶఊಲା(ଷିఏబ)ఊಳି(ଶିఏబ)(ఒఛොି୼௤బ)(ఒఛොି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳ)మ . 
߬̂ ≥ ߬ଵ yields 2ߛ஺ + (3 − ߠ଴)ߛ஻ − (2 − ߠ଴)(ߣ߬̂ − Δݍ଴) ≤ 0. Thus, we have డஈಳడ୼௤బ ≤ 0, 
implying that Vendor B’s profit decreases with Δݍ଴.  
Therefore, when Vendor B releases its products after ߬ா, its profit curve will move 
downwards as the initial quality gap Δݍ଴ becomes larger. Hence, Vendor B’s maximal profit 
obtained by releasing products in [߬ଵ, ܦ] decreases with Δݍ଴.  
Vendor B’s profit obtained from the instant-release strategy increases with ߂ݍ଴, while that 
obtained from the late-release strategy decreases with it. Therefore, there exists a threshold value 
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߂ݍത଴ for the initial quality gap, under which the late-release strategy is more profitable than the 
instant-release strategy.  
Vendor B’s profit maximization problem is, therefore, 
maxఛಳ Π஻ =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ଵଽ [(ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)]మ௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳିఊಳିఊಲ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻, ߬஻ < ߬ଵ,          [ߠ଴(ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻ − ݍ஺଴)(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻, ߬ா < ߬஻ < ߬ଵ,ଵ
ଽ
[(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]మ௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲିఊಲିఊಳ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻, ߬ଵ ≤ ߬஻ ≤ ܦ.       
 (12) 
s.t. ߬஻ ∈ ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯ ∪ (߬ா , ܦ].        
When ߬஻ ∈ [߬ଵ, ܦ], it is intractable to obtain the locally optimal release time in this interval. 
When ݇ = 0, the only root of பஈಳபఛಳ = 0 in [߬ଵ, ܦ] takes the form,  
߬ௗଶ = ஽ସ + ଷ(୼௤బାఊಲାఊಳ)ସఒ + ඥ(஽ఒି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳ)[஽ఒି୼௤బିఊಲିఊಳା௫]ସఒ , 
where ݔ = ଼(ଵିఏబ)ଶିఏబ (2ߛ஺ + ߛ஻) − 8ߛ஺ − 8ߛ஻.  
Hence, when ݇ = 0, in time interval [߬ଵ, ܦ], ߬ଵ and ߬ௗଶ are the only two possible optimal 
solutions for Vendor B. Furthermore, we have பஈಳப௞ < 0; based on the envelop theorem, the 
locally optimal release time of Vendor B in [߬ଵ, ܦ] decreases with ݇, i.e., பఛಳ∗ப௞ < 0.  
Therefore, we conclude that when adopting the late-release strategy, Vendor B should not 
release its product later than time ߬ଵ or time ߬ௗଶ, whichever occurs later. That is, ߬஻∗ <
max{߬ଵ, ߬ௗଶ}.                  □□ 
A.11 Proof of Corollary 4 
From Proposition 2, Vendor B cannot release its products later than time ߬ଵ or time ߬ௗଶ, 
whichever occurs later. Thus, if a type I late-release strategy is adopted, ߬ௗଶ must be larger than 
߬ଵ and the optimal release time must fall within [߬ଵ, ߬ௗଶ). In addition, Lemma 2 indicates that, 
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when product B is released after ߬ଵ, Product A and B coexist in the market and serve the low-
end and the high-end markets, respectively. Regarding Type II late release strategy, Lemma 2 
proves that when product B is released in the winner-take-all time interval (߬ா , ߬ଵ), implying 
that product A will be driven out of the market.   □□ 
A.12 Proof of Lemma 3  
As shown in Table 2, when Vendor B adopts the instant-release strategy, its product quality is 
lower than Vendor A’s. Thus, Vendor B’s profit rate decreases with ߛு or ߛ௅. Hence, Vendor 
B’s total profit also decreases with the level of incompatibility.  
When Vendor B adopts the late-release strategy, and the optimal release time falls within 
(߬ா , ߬ଵ), we have  
Π஻(߬஻) = [ߠ଴(ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻ − ݍ஺଴)(1 − ߠ଴) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ଴)ଶ](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻.  
Obviously, Vendor B’s profit curve moves upward as ߛ஻ becomes larger and its maximal profit 
increases with ߛ஻.  
When Vendor B adopts the late-release strategy, and the optimal release time falls within 
[߬ଵ, ܦ], Vendor B’s profit is 
Π஻(߬஻) = ଵଽ [(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲబ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]మ௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲబିఊಲିఊಳ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻.  
Thus, for a given ߬஻, we have డஈಳ(ఛಳ)డఊಲ < 0 and డஈಳ(ఛಳ)డఊಳ > 0. Therefore, when releasing its 
product in [߬ଵ, ܦ], Vendor B’s maximal profit increases with ߛ஻, while decreases with ߛ஺.  
                     □□ 
A.13 Equilibrium with Switching Cost Considered  
Case I.  
In this case, the vendors’ objectives are to maximize their respective profit rates:  
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ቐ
max௣ಲವ ߨ஺஽ = ݌஺஽൫ߠ෠ − ߠ଴൯,max௣ಳವ ߨ஻஽ = ݌஻஽൫1 − ߠ෠൯.
          (A9) 
s.t. ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠ெ ≤ ߠ෠஽ ≤ ߠ෠ ≤ 1. 
Based on the fulfilled expectation equilibrium, solving (A9) yields the following equilibrium 
solution:  
ە۔
ۓ݌஺஽∗ = (ଵିଶߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିߠ0)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା
೎ೄವషഓಳଷ ,
݌஻஽∗ = (ଶିߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିߠ0)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି
೎ೄವషഓಳଷ .
     (A10-1) 
ۖە
ۖ۔
ۖۖ
ۓߠ෠∗ = 13
(1+ߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯−(1+2ߠ0)ߛܣ−(ߠ0+2)ߛܤ+ ೎ೄವషഓಳݍܤ(߬ܤ)−ݍܣ(߬ܤ)−ߛܣ−ߛܤ
ܳ஺஽∗ = 13
(ଵିଶߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିߠ0)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳݍܤ(߬ܤ)−ݍܣ(߬ܤ)−ߛܣ−ߛܤ   
ܳ஻஽∗ = 13
(ଶିߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିߠ0)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳݍܤ(߬ܤ)−ݍܣ(߬ܤ)−ߛܣ−ߛܤ   
    (A10-2) 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓΠ஺஽∗ = ଵଽ
൤(ଵିଶߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିߠ0)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳ൨
మ
ݍܤ(߬ܤ)−ݍܣ(߬ܤ)−ߛܣ−ߛܤ ,
Π஻஽∗ = ଵଽ
൤(ଶିߠ0)൫௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)൯ି(ଵିߠ0)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳ൨
మ
ݍܤ(߬ܤ)−ݍܣ(߬ܤ)−ߛܣ−ߛܤ .
    (A10-3) 
This equilibrium holds when ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠ெ ≤ ߠ෠஽∗ ≤ ߠ෠∗ < 1.  
Case II.  
In this case, the profit-maximization problem is 
ቐ
max௣ಲವ ߨ஺஽ = ݌஺஽൫ߠ෠ − ߠ෠ெ + ߠ෠஽ − ߠ଴൯,max௣ಳವ  ߨ஻஽ = ݌஻஽൫1 − ߠ෠ + ߠ෠ெ − ߠ෠஽൯ .
       (A11) 
s.t. ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠஽ ≤ ߠ෠ெ < ߠ෠ ≤ 1. 
The corresponding equilibrium prices and profit rates are  
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൞݌஺஽∗ =
൫ଵିଶఏబିఏ෡ಾ൯(௤ಳି௤ಲ)ିଶ(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳ଺ ,
݌஻஽∗ = ൫ଶିఏబାఏ෡
ಾ൯(௤ಳି௤ಲ)ିଶ(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳ଺ .
     (A12-1) 
ە۔
ۓܳ஺஽∗ = ൫ଵିଶఏబିఏ෡
ಾ൯(௤ಳି௤ಲ)ିଶ(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳଷ(௤ಳି௤ಲିଶఊಲିଶఊಳ) ,
ܳ஻஽∗ = ൫ଶିఏబାఏ෡
ಾ൯(௤ಳି௤ಲ)ିଶ(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳଷ(௤ಳି௤ಲିଶఊಲିଶఊಳ) ,
     (A12-2) 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓΠ஺஽∗ = ଵଵ଼
൤൫ଵିଶఏబିఏ෡ಾ൯(௤ಳି௤ಲ)ିଶ(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳ൨
మ
ଷ(௤ಳି௤ಲିଶఊಲିଶఊಳ) ,
Π஻஽∗ = ଵଵ଼
൤൫ଶିఏబାఏ෡ಾ൯(௤ಳି௤ಲ)ିଶ(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳ൨
మ
ଷ(௤ಳି௤ಲିଶఊಲିଶఊಳ) ,
    (A12-3) 
This equilibrium holds when ݌஺஽∗ ≥ 0, ݌஻஽∗ ≥ 0, ܳ஺஽∗ ≥ 0, and ܳ஻஽∗ ≥ 0.  
Case III.  
The two vendors’ objectives are to maximize their respective profit rates:  
ቐ
max௣ಲವ ߨ஺஽ = ݌஺஽൫1 − ߠ෠൯,max௣ಳವ ߨ஻஽ = ݌஻஽൫ߠ෠ − ߠ଴൯ ,
         (A13) 
s.t. ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠ெ < ߠ෠ ≤ 1.           
The equilibrium prices and profit rates take the following forms:  
൞ ݌஺஽∗ =
(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳଷ ,
݌஻஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି
೎ೄವషഓಳଷ .
     (A14-1) 
ۖە
ۖ۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ߠ෠∗ = ଵଷ
(ଵାఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵାଶఏబ)ఊಳି(ఏబାଶ)ఊಲି ೎ೄವషഓಳ௤ಲି௤ಳିఊಲିఊಳ ,
ܳ஺஽∗ = ଵଷ
(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳ௤ಲି௤ಳିఊಲିఊಳ ,   
ܳ஻஽∗ = ଵଷ
(ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳ௤ಲି௤ಳିఊಲିఊಳ ,   
    (A14-2) 
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ۖە
۔
ۖۓ Π஺஽∗ = ଵଽ
൤(ଶିఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಲାଶఊಳ)ା ೎ೄವషഓಳ൨
మ
௤ಲି௤ಳିఊಲିఊಳ ,
Π஻஽∗ = ଵଽ
൤(ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಲି௤ಳ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)ି ೎ೄವషഓಳ൨
మ
௤ಲି௤ಳିఊಲିఊಳ .
    (A14-3) 
The above equilibrium holds when ߠ଴ ≤ ߠ෠ெ < ߠ෠∗ ≤ 1.         □□ 
A.14 Model Extension II: A Model with Quadratic Cost Function 
In this subsection, we analyze the case in which marginal development cost is a quadratic 
function of development time:  
ܿ = ݇߬஻ଶ.          (A15) 
We find that under this new quadratic cost function, the equilibrium prices, demands, and profit 
rates shown in (8) and (9) remain valid.  
In the full-compatibility scenario, the optimal release time for Vendor B can be derived by  
maxఛಳ Π஻ = ൜
ݎ(Δݍ଴ − ߣ߬஻)(ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻ଶ ,  ߬஻ ≤ ߬ா ,ݏ(ߣ߬஻ − Δݍ଴)(ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻ଶ ,  ߬஻ > ߬ா .    (A16) 
where ߬ா = ୼௤బఒ . By solving (A16), we have two local optima: ߬஻ = 0 and ߬஻ = ஽ఒ௦ା௱ బ௦ଶఒ௦ାଶ , 
corresponding to instant-release and late-release strategies, respectively. Proposition 1still holds 
under a quadratic cost function, but the threshold value takes a different form:  
Δݍത଴ᇱ = min ቄܦߣ + ଶ஽௦ [݇(ݎ + ݏ) + ߣݎݏ − (݇ + ߣݏ)ℎ], ஽ఒమ௦ఒ௦ାଶ௞ቅ,  
where ℎ = ට(௞ାఒ௦)௥మା(௞ାఒ௥)௦మାଶ௞௥௦௞ାఒ௦ .  
If the initial quality gap is larger than Δݍത଴ᇱ , Vendor B should release its products 
immediately; otherwise, the late-release strategy is preferred.  
In the partial-compatibility scenario, Vendor B’s profit maximization problem is,  
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maxఛಳ Π஻ =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓଵଽ [(ଵିଶߠ0)(௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳ)ି(ଵିߠ0)(ఊಳାଶఊಲ)]మ௤ಲబି௤ಳబିఒఛಳିఊಳିఊಲ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻ଶ , ߬஻ < ߬ଵ,           [ߠ0(ݍ஻଴ + ߣ߬஻ − ݍ஺଴)(1 − ߠ0) + ߛ஻(1 − ߠ0)ଶ](ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻ଶ , ߬ா < ߬஻ < ߬ଵଵ
ଽ
[(ଶିߠ0)(௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲ)ି(ଵିߠ0)(ଶఊಲାఊಳ)]మ௤ಳబାఒఛಳି௤ಲିఊಲିఊಳ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻ଶ , ߬ଵ ≤ ߬஻ ≤ ܦ.        
 (A17) 
s.t. ߬஻ ∈ ൣ0, ߬ଵ൯ ∪ (߬ா , ܦ].         
As shown in Figure A1, the result in the partial-compatibility scenario still holds when the 
quadratic cost function is adopted.  
  
(a) Optimal Market Entry Strategy (b) Maximal Profit 
Figure A1. Optimal Market Entry Strategy and Maximal Profit of Vendor B 
(ܦ = 20, ߣ = 0.1, ݍ஺଴ = 2, ߠ଴ = 0, ߙ = 0.5, ݇ = 0.1, ݍ஻଴ = 1.25, and ߛ஺, ߛ஻ ∈ [0,0.5]) 
In summary, our main analytically findings still hold even when a quadratic cost function is 
adopted.                    □□ 
A.15 Model Extension III: A Model with Unequal Quality Improvement Rates 
In this subsection, we investigate the scenario where the two vendors have unequal post-release 
quality improvement rates. After ߬஻, the quality levels of product A and B are given by 
൜ݍ஺(߬) = ݍ஺଴ + ߣଶ஺߬,    ߬ ∈ [0, ܦ],              ݍ஻(߬) = ݍ஻଴ + ߣଵ߬஻ + ߣଶ஻(߬ − ߬஻),    ߬ ∈ [߬஻, ܦ],     (A18) 
where ߣଶ஺ and ߣଶ஻ are post-release quality improvement rates of product A and B, 
respectively. Let ߂ߣ denote the difference between ߣଶ஺ and ߣଶ஻, i.e., ߂ߣ = ߣଶ஺ − ߣଶ஻. ߂ߣ >
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0 (߂ߣ < 0) indicates that, after product B’s release, product A’s quality increases faster (slower) 
than that of product B.  
From the solutions of optimal profit rates, i.e., Equations (8-3) and (9-3), we have the 
following findings. In the case of unequal post-release quality improvement rates, as the quality 
gap between the two products in the duopoly stage increases (decreases) over time, the profit 
rates of both vendors increase (decreases) over time. The explanation for this finding is as 
follow. A larger quality gap leads to less competition between the two vendors, so both the prices 
and profit rates for the two products increase. So long as the post-release quality improvement 
doesn’t change the sign of ൫ݍ஺(߬) − ݍ஻(߬)൯, another finding follows immediately: If product B 
has a lower post-release quality improvement rate (ߣଶ஺ > ߣଶ஻), the profit rate of Vendor B 
associated with the instant-release strategy increases over time, whereas its profit rate associated 
with the late-release strategy decreases over time. On the other hand, if the post-release quality 
improvement rate of product B is higher (ߣଶ஺ < ߣଶ஻), the profit rate of Vendor B associated with 
the instant-release strategy decreases over time, whereas its profit rate associated with the late-
release strategy increases over time.  
In Table A1 below, we summarize the changes in quality gap and profit rates of the two 
vendors when their post-release quality improvement rates are different. 
Table A1. Changes in Profit Rates of the Two Vendors 
߂ߣ Strategy Quality Gap (Over time) 
Profit rate of Vendor B 
(Over time) 
Profit rate of Vendor A 
(Over time) 
> 0 Instant-Release Increase Increase Increase Late-Release Decrease Decrease Decrease 
< 0 Instant-Release Decrease Decrease Decrease Late-Release Increase Increase Increase 
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As shown in Table A1, if Vendor B has a lower post-release quality improvement rate than 
Vendor A, the instant-release strategy is preferred by the new entrant; otherwise, the unequal 
quality improvement rates improve Vendor B’s profit in the late-release strategy. This result is 
similar in spirit to Proposition 1. In both cases, the new vendor should adopt the instant-release 
strategy if it is difficult to compete with the incumbent on product quality, and choose the late-
release strategy otherwise. A closer examination of Table A1 reveals that the release strategy 
preferred by the new entrant is always the one that results in an increasing quality gap over time. 
This is because a larger quality gap can effectively reduce the competition between the two 
products.  
  
(a) Optimal Market Entry Strategy (b) Maximal Profit 
Figure A2. Optimal Market Entry Strategy and Maximal Profit of Vendor B 
( ܦ = 20, ߣଵ = 0.1, ݍ஺଴ = 2, ݍ஻଴ = 1.5, ߣଶ஺ ∈ [0,0.05], ߣଶ஻ ∈ [0,0.05], ߠ଴ = 0, ߙ = 0.2, ߛ஺ = ߛ஻ = 0.1, ݇ = 0.1) 
Figure A2(a) shows that an increase in ߣଶ஺ may change Vendor B’s optimal strategy from 
late-release to instant-release, while an increase in ߣଶ஻ has the opposite effect. As shown in 
Figure A2(b), in the region where the instant-release strategy is optimal, Vendor B attains its 
highest profit when ߣଶ஺ = 0.05 and ߣଶ஻ = 0. Similarly, when the values of (ߣଶ஺, ߣଶ஻) falls 
within the region where the late-release strategy is optimal, Vendor B attains its highest profit at 
(ߣଶ஺, ߣଶ஻) = (0, 0.05).                 □□ 
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A.16 Model Extension IV: A Model with Partial Market Coverage 
In the full-compatibility scenario, to ensure that the market is fully covered, the value of ܽ, 
representing the type of customers with the minimum marginal willingness-to-pay, should satisfy  
ߠ଴ݍ௅ − ݌௅஽∗ + ߙ(1 − ߠ଴) > 0,       (A19) 
in which L represents the product with lower quality and ݌௅஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಹି௤ಽ)ଷ . From (A19), we 
have  
ߙ > (ଵିଶఏబ)௤ಹି(ଵାఏబ)௤ಽଷ(ଵିఏబ) .         (A20) 
Similarly, in the partial-compatibility scenario, when (ݍு − ݍ௅) ≥  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு), ߠ଴ 
should satisfy  
ߠ଴ݍ௅ − ݌௅஽∗ + ߙܳ௅஽∗ + ߚுܳு஽∗ > 0.      (A21) 
Because ߠ଴ݍ௅ and ߚுܳு஽∗ are non-negative terms, ߙܳ௅஽∗ > ݌௅஽∗ is a sufficient condition for 
(A21). Substituting ݌௅஽∗ = (ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಹି௤ಽ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)ଷ  and ܳ௅஽∗ =
ଵ
ଷ
(ଵିଶఏబ)(௤ಹି௤ಽ)ି(ଵିఏబ)(ఊಽାଶఊಹ)௤ಹି௤ಽିఊಽିఊಹ  into ߙܳ௅஽∗ > ݌௅஽∗, we have  
ߙ > ݍு − ݍ௅ − ߛ௅ − ߛு.        (A22) 
When (ݍு − ݍ௅) <  ଵିఏబଵିଶఏబ (ߛ௅ + 2ߛு), i.e., in the zero-profit region for Vendor L, the full-
coverage assumption holds unconditionally because the price of L drops to zero.  
Therefore, we conclude that when the intensity of network effects is sufficiently high, our 
assumption that “the value of ߠ଴ is set in such a way that all consumers will purchase either A 
or B in the duopoly stage” can be satisfied.  
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Figure A3. Market segmentation 
Figure A3 shows the market segmentation under partial market coverage. ߠ෠଴ denotes the 
type of consumer who is indifferent between purchasing product L and making no purchasing. In 
this case, the two vendors’ equilibrium prices when the two products are fully compatible are  
ቐ݌ு
஽∗ = (ݍு − ݍ௅) ଶ௤ಹିఈସ௤ಹି௤ಽିଷఈ ,݌௅஽∗ = (ݍு − ݍ௅) ௤ಽାఈସ௤ಹି௤ಽିଷఈ .
        (A23) 
Both ݌ு஽∗ and ݌௅஽∗ equal zero when ݍு = ݍ௅; thus, Lemma 2 still holds under partial market 
coverage. That is, the new entrant should not release its product at the time when its product 
quality equals that of the incumbent.  
For robustness check, we analyze an extreme case in which the intensity of network effects 
equals zero (ߙ = 0). In this case, the optimal prices, demand, and profit rates for the two vendors 
are  
ቐ݌ு
஽∗ = ଶ௤ಹ(௤ಹି௤ಽ)ସ௤ಹି௤ಽ ,
݌௅∗ = ௤ಽ(௤ಹି௤ಽ)ସ௤ಹି௤ಽ ,
 ቐܳு
∗ = ଶ௤ಹସ௤ಹି௤ಽ ,ܳ௅∗ = ௤ಹସ௤ಹି௤ಽ ,
 ቐ ߨு
∗ = ସ௤ಹమ (௤ಹି௤ಽ)(ସ௤ಹି௤ಽ)మ ,
ߨ௅∗ = ௤ಹ௤ಽ(௤ಹି௤ಽ)(ସ௤ಹି௤ಽ)మ ,
   (A24) 
The optimal release time can be obtained by solving  
maxఛಳ Π஻ = ቐ
௤ಲ(ఛಳ)௤ಳ(ఛಳ)[௤ಲ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಳ(ఛಳ)][ସ௤ಲ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಳ(ఛಳ)]మ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻, ߬஻ ≤ ߬ா ,
ସ௤ಳమ (ఛಳ)[௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)][ସ௤ಳ(ఛಳ)ି௤ಲ(ఛಳ)]మ (ܦ − ߬஻) − ݇߬஻, ߬஻ > ߬ா .
  (A25) 
Since the optimal release time for the new entrant is analytically intractable, we choose to 
graphically compare the profits of Vendor B under full and partial market coverage. The solid 
and the dotted lines in Figure A4 represent the profit curves of Vendor B under full coverage, 
ߠ଴ 1 ߠ෠଴ ߠ෠஽ 
H L No purchase 
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and partial coverage, respectively. As shown in the figure, although the optimal release time and 
profit for Vendor B under partial coverage differs from those under full coverage, the pattern of 
two-local-optima remains unchanged.  
(a) ߂ݍ଴ = 0.25 (b) ߂ݍ଴ = 0.5 (c) ߂ݍ଴ = 0.75 
Figure A4. Profit Comparison 
(ܦ = 20, ߣ = 0.1, ݍ஺ = 2, ߠ଴ = 0, ߙ = 0.2 (for full coverage only), ݇ = 0.1) 
We have also examined whether instant release and late release remain the only feasible release 
strategies under partial market coverage. We find that, theoretically speaking, a third possible 
strategy does exist. Specifically, under partial market coverage, after adopting the instant-release 
strategy, Vendor B’s product quality is lower than Vendor A’s. In this case, if Vendor B increases 
its product quality, more low-end consumers will be attracted to purchase product B, i.e., ߠ෠଴ 
becomes smaller. However, when we assume ߠ଴ to be sufficiently large to ensure that the market 
is fully covered, such expansion in low-end market wouldn’t exist. Therefore, using ߠ଴ to assure 
full-market coverage could in some cases eliminate Vendor B’s incentive to increase its product 
quality.  
As discussed above, when we relax the full-market coverage assumption by considering the 
partial-coverage scenario (i.e., ߠ ∈ [0,1]), a higher quality for product B will attract more low-
end customers; thus, it is theoretically possible that the “releasing on time 0” strategy could change 
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to “releasing in (0, ߬ா),” which allows Vender B to further increase its quality even when it 
determines to target the low end market. However, further analysis reveals that even in the partial-
coverage scenario (i.e., ߠ ∈ [0,1] ), Vendor B prefers “releasing at time 0” to “releasing in 
(0, ߬ா)” in most cases. This is because although delaying the release from time 0 to a later time in 
(0, ߬ா) might lead to a slightly larger market share for Vendor B, the benefit of releasing its 
product at time 0 can still be higher for the following reasons: 
(a) Releasing at time 0 would give Vendor B the longest possible duration of service.  
(b) Releasing at time 0 would save Vendor B’s development cost.  
(c) Releasing at time 0 would help Vendor B better differentiate its product from the incumbent’s 
in quality, thus reducing competition between the vendors. 
To examine the tradeoffs, we have conducted additional numerical experiments. We find that 
“releasing at time 0” can still be a viable strategy under various circumstances, whereas “releasing 
in (0, ߬ா)” can be optimal only when the initial quality of vendor B’s product is close to 0. Recall 
that the scenario we consider in this study is that Vendor B’s product is ready for release at time 
0, which indicates that product B’s initial quality cannot be too low. Therefore, although it is 
theoretically possible for “releasing in (0, ߬ா)” to be an optimal strategy, the probability that it 
would occur under the scenario we consider is very small. 
 
